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SEE REPOSE RUN: SETTING THE BOUNDARIES OF
THE RULE OF REPOSE IN ENVIRONMENTAL
TRESPASS AND NUISANCE CASES
JILL E. EVANS*
ABSTRACT
Application of the rule of repose to environmental contamination
claims for trespass and nuisance will preclude recovery for plaintiffs who
discover the harm or injury outside the repose period. The rule of repose is
subject neither to the discovery rule or other equitable tolling devices and
runs from the date of the defendant’s culpable conduct.1 As a consequence,
the rule extinguishes claims regardless of accrual of the cause of action.
Environmental plaintiffs suffering property damage are particularly vul-
nerable to the repose bar as harm can occur over many years through the
migration of unseen contaminants. Operation of the rule of repose within
the construct of trespass and nuisance law, which includes the doctrine of
continuing trespass or nuisance, offers an opportunity for environmental
plaintiffs who can demonstrate a continuing course of conduct to circum-
vent the repose bar without subverting the rule’s primary purpose of bring-
ing certainty to stale claims.2 Key, however, is the identification of the
defendant’s act which will trigger the running of the rule.3 This Article ana-
lyzes several different points at which the defendant may be said to have
acted in both singular and continuing conduct and the impact on both the
plaintiff and the repose period. The Article proposes that continuing tort
theory can help to rebalance the equities between plaintiffs and defendants,
and opens the door to a more rational expansion of the pool of resources
dedicated to the costs associated with environmental contamination.
The young man knows the rules, but the older man knows
the exception.
–Oliver Wendell Holmes4
* Samford University, jeevans@samford.edu.
1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 899(g) (1979).
2 See Albert C. Lin, Application of the Continuing Violation Doctrine to Environmental Law,
23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 723, 729, 755–56 (1996).
3 Id. at 729.
4 Across the Editor’s Desk, 2 AM. J. MED. JURIS. 140 (Feb. 1939).
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INTRODUCTION
The rule of repose is a common law or statutory bar that precludes
a plaintiff from bringing a claim for relief after a certain number of years
following the harm or conduct giving rise to the action.5 The rule begins
to run at the time of the defendant’s act or conduct, and is independent of
when the plaintiff may have suffered legally compensable harm.6 As a con-
sequence, the rule can divest a plaintiff’s right to bring a claim regardless
of whether the action has accrued or the statute of limitations has run.7
In most jurisdictions, rules of repose are considered absolute bars.8 Once
the repose period expires, the plaintiff has no further recourse against the
defendant and any remedies that might have existed, either in the present
or in the future, are extinguished.9
Unlike their statute of limitations cousin, rules of repose are not
subject to tolling devices such as the discovery rule, which developed to
ameliorate perceived unfairness surrounding statute of limitations bars.10
Instead, the rule of repose inexorably marches towards extinction of the
plaintiff’s claim even though the plaintiff might be unaware, through no
fault of his own, of the facts giving rise to the cause of action or of the exis-
tence of any harm. The harshness of repose on the unknowing plaintiff is
particularly apparent in trespass and nuisance cases involving environ-
mental contamination, where the plaintiff’s harm or injury may not occur
5 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 899 (1979).
6 Wayne v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 730 F.2d 392, 401–02 (5th Cir. 1984); See v. Hartley, 896 P.2d
1049, 1053 (Kan. 1995) (quoting Harding v. K.C. Wall Prods., Inc., 831 P.2d 958, 967 (Kan.
1992)); Cronin v. Howe, 906 S.W.2d 910, 913 (Tenn. 1995) (stating that the statute of repose
is “entirely unrelated to the accrual of a cause of action and can, in fact, bar a cause of action
before it has accrued”). See also WILLIAM L. PROSSER & W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 168 (W. Page Keeton et. al. eds., 5th ed. 1984).
7 See, e.g., Stirchak v. Shiley, Inc., 1996 WL 166958, at *2–3 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 5,1996) (find-
ing a plaintiff’s right to bring a claim might be terminated before he or she even knows
of the injury).
8 See, e.g., Wayne v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 730 F.2d at 401–02.
9 See Gray v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 821 N.E.2d 431, 440–41 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). “In dis-
tinguishing between a statute of limitations and a statute of repose, we have stated, ‘A
statute of limitation extinguishes a remedy while a statute of repose may bar a cause of
action even before it arises.’ ” Id. at 436 (quoting Kissel v. Rosenbaum, 579 N.E.2d 1322,
1326 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991)).
10 The Limitation Act of 1623 was the forbearer to modern statutes of limitations on com-
mon law claims. See Developments in the Law of Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV.
1177 (1950) [hereinafter Developments in the Law]. The common law of adverse possession
emerged from the Limitation Act of 1623. Id. at 1177. The Act precluded the recovery of
property from someone who had been in open, notorious, and hostile possession adverse
to the claimant’s right for more than twenty years, and would vest title instead in the
possessor. Id.
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or be discovered for a number of years. The courts almost without exception
have held that the operation of the rule is not dependent upon whether
the plaintiff has the right to bring a claim.11 Rather, analysis turns on the
identification of some act or event caused by the defendant from which the
rule is deemed to run.
This Article seeks to address whether the inequities created by the
rule on the unknowing plaintiff can be alleviated in trespass and nuisance
cases that allege harm to property due to environmental contamination.
More specifically this Article examines when the rule of repose is—or
should be—triggered in both traditional trespass and nuisance cases and
also under theories of continuing tort. In doing so, this Article firmly states
that while there is a valid societal need for rules that establish clear and
concrete determinations of the outer bounds of a landowner’s liability,
there is also a valid societal need to apportion risks relating to environ-
mental contamination in a manner that promotes effective and meaningful
environmental stewardship. This Article does not view these twin aims
as irreconcilable. Rather than advocate abrogation or even reconstruction
of the rule in environmental cases, it argues for a workable solution con-
sistent with the rule’s framework, while also utilizing existing common law
doctrine. In this way, the Article proposes an approach that tempers the
rule’s execution in a world filled with economic and scientific complexities
that neither could have been anticipated nor contemplated in early com-
mon law.12 Part I of the Article discusses the common law development of
nuisance, trespass, and the evolution of “entry” within the bounds of those
torts. Part II examines the rule of repose and looks at its application to
claims for environmental contamination in trespass and nuisance cases.
The Article contends that it is imperative to identify the appropriate act by
the defendant in assessing when the rule of repose is triggered and pro-
poses that continuing tort theory in trespass and nuisance affords a vehicle
11 See id. at 1187–88.
12 By the end of World War II, the country experienced significant economic growth with the
concomitant increase in systems designed to facilitate the efficient operation of business.
See Matthew Hilton, Consumers and the State Since the Second World War, 611 ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 66, 70–71 (2007) (describing the rise of widespread consumerism
and its evolving consumer protections in American society and the rest of the industrialized
world). New technologies, mass manufacturing, and retail distribution of an increasing
number and variety of products combined with increasing consumerism to eliminate the
interplay between consumer and manufacturer, and replace it with impersonal trans-
actions. Id. At the same time, those same consumers were becoming more and more aware
that corporate profitability and shareholder approval drove decision-making and not the
safety and welfare of the public. Id.
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for alleviating the harshness of the rule in certain cases without either ab-
rogating or applying the rule outside its existing operational parameters.
The Article concludes that in overly protecting the interests of the defen-
dant as well as certain societal imperatives, the rule of repose reduces the
pool of monies available for remedial efforts and, at times, irrationally
limits the economic costs of environmental contamination to the plaintiff.
Continuing tort theory permits a rebalancing of the equities between
plaintiffs that have not been dilatory and defendants’ right to be free of
stale claims and the attendant economic impact on both the defendant
and society.
I. ENVIRONMENTAL CONTAMINATION AND THE LAW OF TRESPASS
AND NUISANCE
A. Common Law Development of Trespass and Nuisance Actions
Both nuisance and trespass have roots in the English common law
reverence for property rights whereby landowners were held entitled to
the possession and quiet enjoyment of their property.13 American law took
a similar view of the inviolability of individual property rights in cases such
as Pennoyer v. Allen,14 upholding virtually any use of property by the title
holder; including rendering it unfit, so long as that use did not spill onto
neighboring lands.15 At that point, the offending landowner could be sub-
ject to liability, including strict liability.16 The court stated:
Title to land gives to the owner the right to impregnate the
air upon and over the same with such smoke, vapor, and
smells as he desires, provided he does not contaminate the
atmosphere to such an extent as to substantially interfere
with the comfort or enjoyment of others, or injure the use
of their property.17
13 See 4 ST. GEORGE TUCKER BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 218.
14 See generally Pennoyer v. Allen, 14 N.W. 609 (Wis. 1883).
15 Id. at 613.
16 See, e.g., Rylands v. Fletcher, [1866] 1 L.R. Exch. 265 (Eng.), aff’d, [1968] 3 H.L. 330. See
also Mowrer v. Ashland Oil & Ref. Co., 518 F.2d 659, 661–62 (7th Cir. 1975); Indiana
Harbor Belt R.R. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 517 F. Supp. 314, 316–17 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Clark-
Aiken Co. v. Cromwell-Wright Co., 323 N.E.2d 876, 877–78 (Mass. 1975); G. Nelson
Smith III, Nuisance and Trespass Claims in Environmental Litigation: Legislative Inaction
and Common Law Confusion, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 39, 44 (1995).
17 Pennoyer, 14 N.W. at 613.
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Although sharing common roots with trespass in early American
jurisprudence, nuisance law began to retreat from its strict liability origins
and entrenchment in private property rights to incorporate the concept
of fault then emerging in tort law.18 Some suggest that this transforma-
tion resulted from the recognition that in addition to protecting an interest
in property, nuisance also protected a person’s interest in life, health,
and well-being.19 Others argue that with the advent of the Industrial
18 “[W]ith respect to civil liability prior to circa 1800, fault was simply not an essential
inquiry to the common law courts. The issue of cardinal importance was whether the
facts alleged in the plaintiff’s complaint, if true, conformed to the form of action that was
brought. . . . When the issue of fault was present, it was treated as merely incidental.”
H. Marlow Green, Common Law, Property Rights and the Environment: A Comparative
Analysis of Historical Developments in the United States and England and a Model for
the Future, 30 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 541, 546 (1997). See, e.g., Dillon v. Acme Oil Co., 2 N.Y.S.
289, 290–91 (1888) (declining to find liability for contamination of plaintiff’s wells absent
negligence or knowledge of subterranean stream where business was conducted with care
and skill). Liability in nuisance can be based on theories of intentional tort, negligence or
strict liability. The Restatement (Second) of Torts divides nuisance into invasions which
are intentional and unreasonable and those which are unintentional but still actionable.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 (1979).
19 See, e.g., Carpenter v. Double R Cattle Co., 669 P.2d 643 (Id. Ct. App. 1983), vacated, 701
P.2d 222 (1985). (“Even those legal scholars who advocate the most limited role for injunc-
tions as a remedy against nuisances acknowledge that damages may be inadequate, and
injunctions may be necessary, where the harm in question relates to personal health and
safety, or to one’s fundamental freedom of action within the boundaries of his property.”)
A private nuisance involves the interference with private property rights. Russell Corp.
v. Sullivan, 790 So. 2d 940, 951 (Ala. 2001). (Public nuisance, on the other hand, looks at
the interference with public rights. Common law in most jurisdictions has long held that
a private individual may sue to remedy a public nuisance where he or she demonstrates an
individual and specific injury, different in kind from the injury suffered by the public as a
whole. The Court notes that § 6-5-120 “is a codification of Alabama’s common-law nui-
sance principles”); Dozier v. Troy Drive-In-Theatres, Inc., 89 So. 2d 537, 548 (Ala. 1956)
(describing that states and cities may enjoin a public nuisance, but a private individual can
only do so if “he shows irreparable injury and damage peculiar to him, and such damage
must relate to the use and occupancy of property as distinguished from damage to market
value or property not used or occupied”); Stone Container Corp. v. Stapler, 83 So. 2d 283,
287 (Ala. 1955) (stating that complainants were allowed to bring a claim under their own
name to abate a public nuisance from which they suffered “inconvenience, annoyance, and
injury not endured by the general public and, of consequence, they suffer a substantial
damage peculiar to them”); Rosser v. Randolph, 7 Port. 238, 244–45 (Ala. 1838) (stating
that an injunction may be enjoined for a public nuisance by a private individual if it can
be shown that the proposed erection of a structure threatens “materially to impair the
comfort of the existence of those living near it”). The injury does not have to be unique to
the plaintiff. Stone Container Corp., 83 So. 2d at 287 (noting that standing to bring public
nuisance for an injury not endured by the general public did not depend on unique harm
to each claimant but to the peculiar harm to the collective claimants). Statutes also can
imbue plaintiffs to act as private attorneys general. See, e.g., PUBLIC NUISANCES—SPECIAL
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Revolution, some balancing of competing property interests was required
to ensure economic progress and stability.20 The result, however, was that
nuisance law shifted its inquiry to whether a substantial interference with
the reasonable use and enjoyment of the property of another has occurred.21
DAMAGE TO INDIVIDUAL, ALA. CODE § 6-5-123 (“If a public nuisance causes special damage
to an individual in which the public does not participate, such special damage gives a right
of action.”); Arizona Copper Co. v. Gillespie, 230 U.S. 46, 57 (1913) (affirming Arizona
Supreme Court decision holding that individual riparian owner may bring nuisance action
for polluting river, despite public nuisance to larger community of riparian owners using
water for irrigation purposes). See also Graceland Corp. v. Consolidated Laundries Corp.,
180 N.Y.S.2d 644, 646 (App. Div. 1958) (stating that where there is a substantial obstruc-
tion of a public sidewalk, a plaintiff who suffers damage distinct from that of the general
public may bring a nuisance action); Surfside v. County Line Land Co., 340 So. 2d 1287, 1289
(Fla. App. 1977) (affirming nearby landowner’s standing to bring public nuisance action to
enjoin town’s dump from accepting waste from outside entities); Bishop Processing Co. v.
Davis, 132 A.2d 445, 449 (Md. 1957) (holding that plaintiffs were entitled to relief, despite
whether defendant’s activity constituted a public or private nuisance, where they had es-
tablished sufficient discomfort to themselves and injury to their properties); Knierim v.
Leatherwood, 542 S.W.2d 806, 810–11 (Tenn. 1976) (holding that private plaintiff may bring
suit to protect a public roadway where he has shown a special interest in the public road).
20 See Samuel B. Clarke, Criticisms Upon Henry George, Reviewed from the Stand-Point
of Justice, 1 HARV. L. REV. 265, 276 (1888) (“The thing forgotten is this: the natural rights
are not absolute, but as to every man are limited by the corresponding rights of other
men.”). “Nineteenth century nuisance models based on natural property rights spawned
a morass of doctrine incapable of rationalization within single internally inconsistent
normative theory. . . . Courts drawn to a static absolute dominion model struggled to jus-
tify limited intrusions on absolute right for the sake of social and economic progress without
permitting utility to swallow natural right.” Robert G. Bone, Normative Theory and Legal
Doctrine in American Nuisance Law: 1850 to 1920, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 1101, 1224 (1986). See,
e.g., Boston Ferrule Co. v. Hills, 34 N.E. 85, 86–87 (Mass. 1893) (while recognizing England
instructs its juries that parties must not stand on “extreme rights” when engaged in in-
dustry, the Massachusetts court found that conflicting rights are subject to “a pure question
of policy in the first instance” and that the line “must be drawn on practical grounds”).
21 See, e.g., Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 872 (N.Y. 1970) (noting that
an injunction is denied in some cases when consequences, especially economic, were un-
substantial to the plaintiff or when no benefit to the plaintiff could be contemplated). The
plaintiff must prove intentional conduct (or the failure to exercise due care) on the part of
the defendant to interfere with the plaintiffs use or enjoyment of property and that the inter-
ference that resulted was of “such a nature, duration, or amount as to constitute unreason-
able interference with the use and enjoyment of the land.” Pagel v. Burlington N. Santa Fe
Ry. Co., 316 F. Supp. 2d 984, 989 (D. Kan. 2004). See also Page Keeton, Trespass, Nuisance,
and Strict Liability 59 COLUM. L. REV. 457, 460–61 (1959) (discussing the views of Prosser
and others on the relationship between nuisance and strict liability for ultrahazardous
activities and positing that “[w]hile I certainly am not here suggesting that ‘fault’ in the
usual sense should be a prerequisite to liability in all cases, I do suggest that a distinction
should be made between intentional and unintentional invasions, however caused and
by whatever means.”).
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Trespass remained focused on the actual invasion of the right to posses-
sion of property and, although the law of trespass also incorporates some
aspects of fault (as reflected by the requirement that entry be intentional
or negligent), the inquiry in trespass looks only to the defendant’s act of
entry, regardless of the defendant’s knowledge as to the plaintiff’s posses-
sory interests.22
In essence, an action for nuisance attempts to balance the rights of
property owners to use and control their land as they see fit against the
right of neighboring land owners to prevent impairment of the use of their
own property.23 It is the “unreasonable use” element of a nuisance action
that determines when an invasion upsets this balance.24 To proceed in nui-
sance, it is not enough that the plaintiff simply be occasionally inconve-
nienced or offended by the interference. As explained by the court in Dixie
Ice Cream Co. v. Blackwell:
In general, home owners and occupants, as well as all others
must endure, without legal recourse, all of those petty an-
noyances and discomforts ordinarily and necessarily inci-
dent to the conduct of those trades and businesses which
22 The Restatement recognizes negligent trespass as a tort to relieve parties who have sus-
tained an injury when a cause of action does not lie under traditional claims of intentional
trespass or nuisance. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 165 (1965). “One who recklessly
or negligently, or as a result of an abnormally dangerous activity, enters land in the pos-
session of another or causes a thing or third person so to enter is subject to liability to the
possessor . . . . An important distinguishing element of negligent trespass is that the
claim is not actionable if the entry is harmless . . . if, but only if, his presence of the
presence of the thing or the third person upon the land causes harm to the land, to the
possessor, or to a thing or a third person in whose security the possessor has a legally pro-
tected interest.” Id. See also id. at cmt. c (elaborating on which injuries are protected under
negligent trespass).
23 Tichenor v. Vore, 953 S.W.2d 171, 176 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) Under the Restatement, “[O]ne
is subject to liability for a private nuisance if, but only if, his conduct is a legal cause of an
invasion of another’s interest in the private use and enjoyment of land, and the invasion
is either (a) intentional and unreasonable, or (b) unintentional and otherwise actionable
under the rules controlling liability for negligent or reckless conduct, or for abnormally
dangerous conditions or activities.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 822 (1979).
24 See Pestey v. Cushman, 788 A.2d 496 (Conn. 2002), aff’d, 788 A.2d 496 (Conn. 2002)
(discussing the “unreasonableness” element of nuisance claim); Boomer, 257 N.E.2d at
872–74 (discussing the issue of injunctive relief even though a disparity exists in the eco-
nomic consequences between the effect of the nuisance and the effect of the injunction).
But see Carpenter, 701 P.2d at 277–78 (holding that the sparse population and economy
were inextricably tied to agriculture, mining and industrial development and that whether
a nuisance existed required consideration of the community interest and circumstances
surrounding the parties move to the locale, among other factors).
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are usually a part of municipal life, and which are more or
less essential to the existence and comfort and progress of
the people . . . But there are limits to this rule.25
Thus, whether or not an interference is “appreciable” or “substantial,”
thereby constituting an unreasonable use, generally turns upon whether
ordinary persons living in the community would find the invasion to be op-
pressive or intolerable.26 The special sensitivities or idiosyncrasies of the
plaintiff cannot convert otherwise reasonable conduct into a nuisance.27
Trespass, on the other hand, protects the plaintiff’s interest in the
exclusive possession of his or her property.28 Trespass imposes liability
for the unauthorized, intentional entry onto the land of another either
directly by the defendant or through an act that causes an object to enter
the plaintiff’s land.29 Defendant liability does not require a specific intent
25 Dixie Ice Cream Co. v. Blackwell, 116 So. 348, 349 (Ala. 1928). See also Baldwin v.
McClendon, 288 So. 2d 761, 764 (Ala. 1974) (considering several factors to determine if
defendant engaged in an actionable nuisance, including the reasonable manner the de-
fendant’s hog-parlor business was conducted, the approved plans and specifications of the
hog-parlor facilities, the “location and proximity of the operation to the appellees’ home,
the intensity and volume of the odors, their interference, if any, with the appellees’ own
well-being and the enjoyment of their home, and any consequential depreciation in value
of their home.” Whether an interference is substantial, however, is a question of fact.).
26 But see Tichenor v. Vore, 953 S.W.2d 171, 177–78 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that a ken-
nel of barking dogs did not constitute petty annoyances, and that plaintiffs were entitled
to relief where they showed they were “ ‘substantially and unreasonably disturbed notwith-
standing proof that others living in the vicinity are not annoyed’ ”) (quoting Rae v. Flynn,
690 So. 2d 1341, 1343 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)).
27 See Frank v. Envtl. Sanitation Mgt., Inc., 687 S.W.2d 876, 880–81 (Mo. 1985). “There
is no exact rule or formula by which the existence of a nuisance or the nonexistence of a
nuisance may be determined. ‘Necessarily each case must stand upon its own special cir-
cumstances, and no definite rule can be given that is applicable in all cases, but when an
appreciable interference with the ordinary enjoyment of property, physically, is clearly made
out as the result of a nuisance, a court of equity will never refuse to interfere, . . . .’.” Id.
at 881 (quoting Crutcher v. Taystee Bread Co., 174 S.W.2d 801, 805 (Mo. 1943)).
28 Trespass was originally a form of action at common law; over time trespass came to refer
to intrusions upon either real or personal property. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 6, at 67.
29 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 cmt. I (1965) (stating an “actor, without him-
self entering the land, may invade another’s interest in its exclusive possession by . . . plac-
ing a thing either on or beneath the surface of the land”); See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 159(1) (1965) (stating “[a] trespass may be committed on, beneath, or above the
surface of the earth”). Intent in trespass actions can be shown either through purpose or
design to cause a trespass, or substantial certainty that the entry will occur, even if the de-
fendant did not intend to “trespass.” W. T. Ratliff Co. v. Henley, 405 So. 2d 141, 146 (Ala.
1981) (stating that “intent [to do] the act which leads to the trespass is the requirement,
not the intent to actually trespass”).
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to enter or invade the plaintiff’s land. Rather, “[w]hat is required . . . is
volition, i.e., a conscious intent to do the act that constitutes the entry
upon someone else’s real or personal property. An involuntary entry onto
another’s property is not a trespass.”30 Courts have found it sufficient to
impose liability for trespass where the defendant sets in motion a course
of events that would be substantially certain to result in the invasion of
the plaintiff’s exclusive right of possession.31 Although usually brought as
an intentional tort, modern cases have permitted recovery for negligent
trespass where the defendant “recklessly or negligently, or as a result of an
abnormally dangerous activity, enters [the] land . . . of another or causes
a thing or third person so to enter . . . if, but only if, his presence or the
presence of the thing or the third person upon the land causes harm.”32
B. The Evolution of “Entry” Within Trespass and Nuisance
Environmental property invasions were historically categorized as
either a trespass or a nuisance based upon whether the intruding agent
was visible to the naked eye.33 Trespass required some tangible physical
entry upon the land.34 Where the intruding agent was invisible, the tres-
pass was considered indirect and the plaintiff was left to his remedy in
30 Baltimore Gas and Elec. Co. v. Flippo, 684 A.2d 456, 461 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996). See
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 cmt. I (1965) (stating “[i]t is enough that an
act is done with knowledge that it will to a substantial certainty result in the entry of the
foreign matter”).
31 Rushing v. Hooper-McDonald, Inc., 300 So. 2d 94, 97 (Ala. 1974) (explaining that a prop-
erty owner who knows to substantial certainty that a polluting substance will invade the
property of another commits an indirect trespass); Miller v. Carnation Co., 516 P.2d 661,
664 (Colo. App. 1973) (finding prima facie case for trespass could be established by evidence
showing the defendant’s failure to remove chicken manure resulted in “breeding and multi-
plication of flies and that the flies intruded upon plaintiff’s property”). In W.T. Ratliff Co.,
for example, the court found that a reasonable person could foresee that when it rained
sand and gravel could wash onto the plaintiff’s property, “[t]hus, when Ratliff placed the
sand and gravel on its own leased property with knowledge to a substantial certainty that
such action could lead to trespass when it rained, the element of intent was satisfied.”
Ratliff, 405 So. 2d at 146. But see United Proteins Inc. v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 915 P.2d
80, 83 (Kan. 1996) (noting that common law trespass has sometimes permitted uninten-
tional and nonnegligent acts and stating “Kansas follows the modern and near universal
view that it is an intentional tort.”).
32 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 165 (1965); Mercer v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 24 F.
Supp. 2d 735, 743 (W.D. Ky. 1998) (action for negligent trespass for polychlorinated biphenyl
(PCB) contamination).
33 See, e.g., Maddy v. Vulcan Materials Co., 737 F. Supp. 1528, 1539 (D. Kan. 1990).
34 Id.
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nuisance.35 The traditional elements of trespass demanding a tangible
entry eroded as courts began to acknowledge that the distinction between
direct and indirect invasions failed to recognize that intrusions that were
invisible to the naked eye were no less intrusive or invasive than those
that could be seen.36 In Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co.,37 the court rejected
the view that a trespass could not occur through unseen particulates, stat-
ing that the proper inquiry was whether the defendant’s conduct violated
a legally protected interest of the plaintiff.38
We think that a possessor’s interest in land as defined by
the considerations recited above may, under the appropriate
circumstances, be violated by a ray of light, by an atomic
particle, or by a particulate of fluoride and, contrariwise,
if such interest circumscribed by these considerations is
not violated or endangered, the defendant’s conduct, even
though it may result in a physical intrusion, will not render
him liable in an action of trespass.39
Acknowledging that in some instances an action would lie for both
trespass and nuisance, the court found the distinction turned on when
the plaintiff had a protectable interest in exclusive possession, which was
35 Common law distinguished forms of action for trespass and trespass on the case. See
Elizabeth Jean Dix, The Origins of the Action of Trespass on the Case, 46 YALE L.J. 1142,
1147 (1937). A writ for trespass could be presented for invasions that were direct and re-
quired a tangible entry onto the land. Id. Trespass on the case was the repository for inva-
sions or intrusions such as smoke, odors, or noise and other intangibles. Borland v. Sanders
Lead Co., 369 So. 2d 523, 527 (Ala. 1979) (“The modern action for trespass to land stemmed
inexorably from the common law action for trespass which lay when the injury was both
direct and substantial. Nuisance, on the other hand, would lie when injuries were indirect
and less substantial.”).
36 Williams v. Oeder, 659 N.E.2d 379, 383 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (recognizing a claim for tres-
pass if plaintiff could prove substantial harm caused by airborne particulate matter from
nearby plants); Vulcan Materials Co., 737 F. Supp. 1528, 1540 (D. Kan. 1990) (“Only if the
indirect and intangible invasion causes substantial damage to the plaintiff’s property,
thereby infringing his exclusive possessory interest in the property, will an action for tres-
pass lie”). Some jurisdictions declined to follow the shift away from the requirement that an
entry be by a tangible object. Adams v. Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co., 602 N.W.2d 215, 220 (Mich.
1999). In Adams, the court was unwilling to relinquish the traditional distinction, finding
that the modern trend effectively collapsed the torts of trespass and nuisance. Id. at 220
(stating “Accordingly, we decline plaintiff’s invitation to strip the tort of trespass to land
of its distinctive accouterments and commingle its identity with other causes of action.”).
37 Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 342 P.2d 790 (Or. 1959).
38 Id. at 797.
39 Id.
2013] SEE REPOSE RUN 129
inextricably intertwined with an inquiry into the interference with the
plaintiff’s use and possession.40 The court held it was irrelevant whether
the intrusion was through visible or invisible particles, such as the fluoride
particulates at issue before it, recognizing science had progressed to the
point of making such distinctions meaningless.41
It is quite possible that in an earlier day when science had
not yet peered into the molecular and atomic world of small
particles, the courts could not fit an invasion through un-
seen physical instrumentalities into the requirement that
a trespass can result only from a direct invasion . . . and
that our concept of ‘things’ must be reframed.42
As a consequence, the relevant inquiry looked to whether the invasion
violated a “protected interest in exclusive possession.”43
In 1979, the Alabama Supreme Court in Borland v. Sanders Lead
Co.44 similarly rejected reliance upon the visibility of the intruding agent as
the test for when an action would lie in trespass as opposed to nuisance.45
Relying in part on the Oregon decision in Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co.,46
the Borland court also concluded that a trespass claim could be brought for
intangible entry.47 The court did not wholly abandon the direct/indirect
40 Id. at 795. The Martin court discussed the historical underpinnings of trespass in criminal
law noting that trespass was regarded as a breach of the peace, but also clearly incorporat-
ing notions of possession and ownership. Id. at 796. “If then, we find that . . . interfering
with the plaintiff’s possession, does, or is likely to result in arousing conflict between them,
that act will characterize the tort as a trespass, assuming the other elements of the tort are
made out.” Id.
41 Id. at 793.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 794.
44 Borland v. Sanders Lead Co., 369 So. 2d 523 (Ala. 1979).
45 Id. at 527. A fictitious “dimensional” test arose, which obviated the necessity of determin-
ing whether the intrusion was “direct” and “substantial.” Id. If the intruding agent could
be seen by the naked eye, the intrusion was considered a trespass. Id. If the agent could not
be seen, it was considered indirect and less substantial, hence, a nuisance. Id.
46 Id. (noting that the Borland court characterized the Martin test as a “force and energy
test.”).
47 Borland, 369 So. 2d at 529. The Martin court reasoned that:
It is quite possible that in an earlier day when science had not yet peered
into the molecular and atomic world of small particles, the courts could
not fit an invasion through unseen physical instrumentalities into the
requirement that a trespass can result only from a direct invasion. But 
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distinction however. Rather, the court held that in order for an indirect
invasion to rise to the level of trespass, the plaintiff must prove:
1) an invasion affecting an interest in the exclusive posses-
sion of his property; 2) an intentional doing of the act which
results in the invasion; 3) reasonable foreseeability that the
act done could result in an invasion of plaintiff’s possessory
interest; and 4) substantial damage to the Res.48
Borland cautions that there will be cases where the invasion is “so lacking
in substance that the law will refuse to recognize it.”49 The court pointed as
examples to  invasions such as exhaust from passing cars, and similar de
minimis entries that, although technically an invasion, are considered part
of living in society and simply do not affect the right to exclusive posses-
sion and control.50
Martin, Borland, and other cases rejecting the distinction between
direct and indirect entry onto land as the demarcation between trespass
and nuisance facilitated the ability to recover in cases of environmental
in this atomic age even the uneducated know the great and awful force
contained in the atom and what it can do to a man’s property if it is
released . . . and that our concept of ‘things’ must be reframed.
Martin, 342 P.2d at 793.
48 Borland, 369 So. 2d at 529. See Smith v. Carbide & Chems. Corp., 298 F. Supp. 2d 561,
569 (W.D. Ky. 2004), rev’d and remanded, 507 F.3d 372 (holding that where invasion is by
invisible particles it is “only when the substance actually damages the property does it
intrude upon the landowner’s right to exclusive possession.”) (quoting Mercer v. Rockwell
Int’l Corp., 24 F. Supp. 2d 735, 743 (W.D. Ky. 1998)); Nat’l Tel. Coop. Ass’n v. Exxon Corp.,
38 F. Supp. 2d 1, 15 (D.D.C. 1998) (“[T]he tort of trespass, when based on the invasion of
gases or microscopic particles, has assumed similar dimensions of nuisance law by requir-
ing an actual showing of harm or interference with land.”); Bradley v. Am. Smelting &
Ref. Co., 635 F. Supp. 1154, 1156 (W.D. Wash. 1986) (noting that the plaintiff must show
actual and substantial damage to property to recover for trespass arising out of presence
of imperceptible particles).
49 Borland, 369 So. 2d at 529.
50 Id. “If the Court were to permit the landowners in this case to recover for mere presence
of toxic substance on their land without proof of a resulting health or safety hazard, ‘it would
result in an allowance of recovery for alleged injury to property in instances in which
individuals who have ingested a toxic substance may not recover.’ ” Smith, 298 F. Supp.
2d 561, 572 (W.D. Ky. 2004) (quoting Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. Wilhite, 143 S.W.3d 604, 623
(Ky. Ct. App. 2003)); see also John Larkin, Inc. v. Marceau, 959 A.2d 551, 555 (Vt. 2008)
(“Because the ambient environment always contains particulate matter from many sources,
such a technical reading of trespass would subject countless persons and entities to auto-
matic liability for trespass absent any demonstrated injury.”).
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contamination.51 Decisions such as New York v. Shore Realty Corp.,52
Chance v. BP Chemicals Inc.,53 Kelly v. Para-Chem Southern, Inc.,54 and
their brethren reflected recognition of the need for the law to adapt to the
dangers imposed on society with the advent of industrialization—finding
with little difficulty that chemical wastes discharged by companies into the
environment have caused pollution and pose a threat to the health and wel-
fare of the community.55 In some instances, the intrusion onto the plain-
tiff’s property was immediately apparent.56 In others, pollution occurred
over decades as corporations deposited untreated wastes and by-products
from industrial operations directly into ground soil and waterways.57 In
New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection v. Ventron Corp.,58
for example, operation of a mercury processing plant for more than 50 years
resulted in more than 268 tons of mercury-laden toxic waste saturating
the land and contaminating a long stretch of the nearby waterway.59
51 “Hence the modern view ‘departs from traditional trespass rules by refusing to infer dam-
ages as a matter of law’ with respect to intangible invasions of property, as would be the
case with direct, tangible invasions of property.” John Larkin, Inc., 959 A.2d at 554. But see,
e.g., Adams v. Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co., 602 N.W.2d 215 (Mich. 1999) (declining to discard
the traditional requirements of trespass and holding that the intrusion must be by a person
or tangible thing).
52 New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1051–52 (2d Cir. 1985) (“We have no
doubt that the release or threat of release of hazardous waste into the environment un-
reasonably infringes upon a public right and thus is a public nuisance as a matter of New
York law.”). See also New York v. Schenectady Chems., 479 N.Y.S.2d 1010, 1013 (App. Div.
1984) (stating that it “[did] not hesitate in recognizing that the seepage of chemical wastes
into a public water supply constitutes a public nuisance”).
53 Chance v. BP Chems., Inc., 670 N.E.2d 985, 992 (Ohio 1996) (“If appellee’s act of placing
the injectate into the rock interferes with appellants’ reasonable and foreseeable use of their
properties, appellee could be liable.”).
54 Kelly v. Pare-Chem S., Inc., 428 S.E.2d 703 (S.C. 1993) (permitting recovery for ground-
water contamination).
55 See, e.g., Selma Pressure Treating Co. v. Osmose Wood Preserving Co., 271 Cal. Rptr. 596
(Ct. App. 1990) (permitting indemnity claim grounded in nuisance by wood treatment com-
pany against contractor for installation of defective waste disposal system); Schenectady
Chems., 479 N.Y.S.2d at 1013–14 (holding that an action for public nuisance still existed
where chemical waste had polluted surface and groundwater 15 to 30 years after disposal).
See also Mercer v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 24 F. Supp. 2d 735, 735 (W.D. Ky. 1998) (action in
negligent trespass for PCB contamination); New Jersey Dep’t of Envtl. Protection v. Ventron
Corp., 468 A.2d 150 (N.J. 1983) (migration of toxic pollutants from mercury processing
operations constitutes “abnormally dangerous” activity).
56 See, e.g., United Fuel Gas Co. v. Sawyers, 259 S.W.2d 466 (Ky. 1953) (denying liability
absent negligence where three days after defendant began drilling a gas well on its prop-
erty, plaintiff’s water cell was contaminated).
57 Ventron, 468 A.2d at 154.
58 Id.
59 Id.
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As a result, a number of environmental trespass and nuisance cases
involve the unseen migration of pollutants through ground soil or ground-
water onto adjoining property.60 Unfortunately, despite the trespass by the
defendant and the very real harm to property suffered by the plaintiff, re-
covery is not assured. Unlike tangible pollutants such as soot or contami-
nation that cause discoloration of ground soil, unseen contaminants can be
insidious and carry no obvious signs of their presence. Plaintiff property
owners may have no knowledge of the contamination until vegetation dies,
animals sicken, or family members fall ill.61 More significant, in many in-
stances the environmental plaintiff may remain unaware of the contam-
ination for a number of years. In such cases, the rule of repose will bar
claims for recovery where the plaintiff does not discover the contamina-
tion until after the repose period has run.62 As a consequence, the rule of
repose can present a significant obstacle to the redress of environmental
damages to property.
II. THE FORM AND FUNCTION OF THE RULE OF REPOSE
Rules of repose have English antecedents in the doctrine of prescrip-
tion, which presumed the acquisition of title to property by possession over
time.63 As in England, American courts adopted a common law rule estab-
lishing a 20-year period as sufficient time within which to bring a claim,
60 See, e.g., Artesian Water Co. v. Gov’t of New Castle Cnty., 1983 WL 17986 (Del. Ch.
Aug. 4, 1983) (holding that a privately owned public utility for supplying water was allowed
to seek damages for contamination of groundwater from the County landfill but right was
limited to the utility’s reasonable use of groundwater); Wilsonville v. SCA Servs., Inc., 426
N.E.2d 824, 836–37 (Ill. 1981) (prospectively enjoining a chemical waste disposal from oper-
ating in the location and manner that created a high probability of causing a public nui-
sance by either “an explosive interaction, migration, subsidence, or the ‘bathtub effect’ ”).
61 See, e.g., Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. v. American Cyanamid Co., 517 F. Supp. 314 (N.D. Ill.
1981), rev’d and remanded, 916 F.2d 1174 (7th Cir. 1990) (analyzing strict liability in toxic
waste); Yommer v. McKenzie, 257 A.2d 138 (Md. 1969) (concerning gasoline seepage into
adjoining well); Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 342 P.2d 790 (Or. 1959) (alleging fluoride
compounds rendered land unfit for raising livestock); Branch v. Western Petroleum, 657
P.2d 267 (Utah 1982) (finding contamination by defendant petroleum company’s formation
water, which caused rabbits and chickens to die and polluted potable water supply).
62 Snodgrass v. Snodgrass, 58 So. 201, 201–02 (Ala. 1912).
63 Grants of title would be permitted where the claimant demonstrated possession for at
least 20 years; the doctrine of prescription served a similar role in American law with courts
applying presumptions of title in order to achieve finality and certainty to potential claims.
Glantz v. Gabel, 212 P. 858, 860 (Mont. 1923) (quoting Ricard v. Williams, 20 U.S. 59, 109
(1822) where “They are founded upon the consideration, that the facts are such as could
not, according to the ordinary course of human affairs, occur, unless there was a transmu-
tation of title to, or an admission of an existing adverse title in, the party in possession.”).
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with certain narrowly prescribed exceptions.64 This common law rule even-
tually was joined by statutory rules of repose enacted largely in response
to the emergence of tort reform efforts and targeted towards protecting
certain interest groups from the effects of extended periods of liability that
might exist under the common law rule.65 Indeed, statutes of repose have
become the most prevalent form of repose rule.
Similar to statutes of limitation, the function of repose rules is to
bring certainty and closure to stale claims, thereby reducing the burden
on the judicial system,66 as well as freeing commercial resources that would
have been invested in the economy had they not remained set aside to cover
outstanding contingent liabilities.67 However, although rules of repose are
64 See, e.g., Matthews v. McDade, 72 Ala. 377, 384–89 (1882); McArthur v. Carrie, 32 Ala.
75, 81 (1858); In re Meyer’s Estate, 164 A.2d 633, 639–40 (N.J. App. 1960). In Glantz v.
Gabel, the Montana Supreme Court noted that the period of time during which the adverse
possession had been continuous and unmolested exceeded not only the ten-year statute
of limitations, but exceeded the 20-year common law period necessary for the right to exist
by prescription. Glantz, 212 P. at 860; see also Black v. Pratt Coal & Coke Co., 5 So. 89, 94
(Ala. 1888) (“There is, however, a presumption that any and all claims or rights of property
which have been permitted to slumber without assertion or recognition for 20 years have
no legal existence or have been adjusted.”).
65 The push for tort reform took various forms over the past century, reflected in both pro-
gressive and regressive shifts in the law. See Joseph A. Page, Book Review: Deforming Tort
Reform, 78 GEO. L.J. 649, 654–55 (1990) (reviewing PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE
LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1988)) (describing the origins of the ‘old tort
reform’ as deriving from the “ideas of scholars,” having its most influence on the courts, while
the ‘new tort reform’ is being influenced by the political process, “fueled by the economic
self-interest of those who perceive themselves as adversely affected by the tort system”);
see generally ‘Common Sense’ Legislation: The Birth of Neoclassical Tort Reform, 109 HARV.
L. REV. 1765 (1996) (discussing progressive, classical, and modernist approaches to tort
reform in American jurisprudence over the past century). The political support for recent
tort reform efforts is underwritten by the manufacturers, employers, and professionals,
such as doctors and architects who are opposed to the increasing duties embraced by and
transforming the civil justice system.
66 Stale claims do not simply burden defendants resources; they also lead to increased liti-
gation and administrative costs as well as inefficiencies in case management and judicial
resource allocation—a growing concern as court dockets continue to swell. See generally
Tyler T. Ochoa & Andrew Wistrich, Puzzling Purposes of Statutes of Limitation, 28 PAC.
L.J. 453, 456–57, 460, 466–69, 480, 495 (1997) (discussing the purposes of limitation acts
like statutes of repose and describing how those functions benefit public policy).
67 Attendant to plaintiff’s right to seek redress was a defendant’s correlative right to defend.
See Snodgrass, 58 So. 201. A plaintiff’s right to pursue a claim would, at some point, be out-
weighed by the prejudice to the defendant resulting from the disappearance of evidence and
the unavailability of witnesses increasing not only the costs of litigation but the potential
for fraud. Id. Thus, the rule sought to discourage a plaintiff from sitting on his or her rights,
but also to deter frauds and “relieve[,] courts from the necessity of adjudicating rights so
obscured by the lapse of time and the accidents of life that the attainment of truth and
justice is next to impossible.” Id. at 202 (citing Harrison v. Heflin, 54 Ala. 552, 563–64
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rooted in many of the same policies as statutes of limitations, the two serve
very distinct functions.68 Statutes of limitations have been held to be pro-
cedural devices, establishing limits to how long a claim can be brought
once the cause of action has accrued.69 More important, statutes of limita-
tions are considered an affirmative defense, waived if not asserted by the
defendant, and subject to tolling and exceptions arising out of a plaintiff’s
disability.70 Rules of repose, on the other hand, eliminate the plaintiff’s
(1875)); see also Roach v. Cox, 49 So. 578 (Ala. 1909); Semple v. Glenn, 9 So. 265 (Ala.
1891); Garrett v. Garrett, 69 Ala. 429, 430 (1881); Nettles v. Nettles, 67 Ala. 599, 602
(1880); Greenlees v. Greenlees, 62 Ala. 330, 332–33 (1878).
68 Myers v. Hayes Int’l Corp., 701 F. Supp. 618, 624 (M.D. Tenn. 1988).
69 See Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 722–28 (1988) (“There is no more reason to
consider recharacterizing statutes of limitation as substantive under the Full Faith and
Credit Clause than there is to consider recharacterizing a host of other matters generally
treated as procedural under conflicts law, and hence generally regarded as within the forum
State’s legislative jurisdiction.”); Stuart v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 158 F.3d 622, 627 (2d Cir.
1998); Miller v. Stroud Twp., 804 A.2d 749, 752 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002); Sch. Bd. of Norfolk
v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 360 S.E.2d 325, 327–28 (Va. 1987). With the passing of the Limitations
Act of 1623, the modern era of the statute of limitations was born and English law pro-
vided specific lengths of time for real property and personal property actions. See Gail L.
Heriot, A Study in the Choice of Form: Statutes of Limitation and the Doctrine of Laches,
1992 B.Y.U. L. REV. 917 (1993). The Limitations Act of 1623 “is the model for statutes of
limitation adopted by American legislatures.” See also United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S.
111, 117 (1979) (noting that statutes of limitations are legislative enactments that give
plaintiffs a “reasonable time to present their claims, they protect defendants and the courts
from having to deal with cases in which the search for truth may be seriously impaired
by the loss of evidence, whether by death or disappearance of witnesses, fading memories,
disappearance of documents, or otherwise”); Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304,
314 (1945) (“[Statutes of limitations] represent a public policy about the privilege to litigate.
Their shelter has never been regarded as what now is called a ‘fundamental’ right or what
used to be called a ‘natural’ right of the individual.”); Michael E. Baughman, Comment,
Defining the Boundaries of the Adverse Domination Doctrine: Is There Any Repose For
Corporate Directors?, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1065, 1069 (1995). “When the legislature prescribes
time limits on the assertion of rights, it deprives one party of the opportunity, after a time,
of invoking the public power in support of an otherwise valid claim.” Developments in the
Law, supra note 10, at 1185.
70 “[The] ‘pure’ or procedural statute of limitations . . . serves only to place a time limit
upon assertion of a remedy and furnishes an affirmative defense that may be waived.”
Bell v. Schell, 101 P.3d 465, 472 (Wyo. 2004) (quoting Friends of Clark Mountain Found.
Inc. v. Bd. of Supervisors of Orange Cnty., 406 S.E.2d 19, 21 (Va. 1991)). See also Missouri
v. St. Gemme’s Adm’r, 23 Mo. 344, 346–47 (1856) (“It is a settled principle in the construc-
tion of the statute of limitations, that the statute does not begin to run until there be per-
sons in being capable of suing and being sued, according to the maxim of the Roman law,
‘contra non volentem agere non currit prescriptio.’ ”); Roldan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 149 A.D.2d
20, 33–34 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (citing cases recognizing tolling exceptions apart from
provisions in statutes of limitations due to extraordinary circumstances that prevent the
plaintiff from bringing an action).
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substantive right to bring a claim at all.71 They neither are tied to any
applicable statute of limitations nor waivable by the defendant. Once the
rule begins to run the clock does not stop ticking until the designated time
period—whether statutory or common law—expires and a plaintiff’s right
to bring an action is extinguished.72 Upon the loss of the substantive right,
any attendant remedies are also extinguished, even those that may have
accrued in the future.73
Although rules of repose differ from statutes of limitations in other
ways, it is the manner in which each begins to run that creates difficulties
in claims for environmental contamination. Statutes of limitations are trig-
gered on the date that the plaintiff’s claim accrues.74 Accrual occurs, and
the limitations period begins, on the date that the plaintiff has suffered a
legal injury.75 Determining the point at which the plaintiff’s legal interest
may have been invaded is often difficult.76 For example, the Ninth Circuit
71 Myers, 701 F. Supp. at 623–24 (citing President & Dir. of Georgetown Coll. v. Madden,
660 F.2d 91, 94 (4th Cir. 1981)); Rittenhouse v. Tabor Grain Co., 561 N.E.2d 264, 273 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1990) (distinguishing repose statutes from statutes of limitations by describing the
former’s substantive nature); Nieman v. Press & Equip. Sales Co., 588 F. Supp. 650, 653–54
(S.D. Ohio 1984) (adopting repose statute in a diversity suit due to its substantive qualities
over the forum state’s statute of limitations).
72 Myers, 701 F. Supp. at 624.
73 Id. As a result, there could no longer be an existing claim for the court to adjudicate or
to which equitable estoppel could apply.
74 Garrett v. Raytheon Co., 368 So. 2d 516, 518–19 (Ala. 1979).
75 See, e.g., id. at 519 overruled by Griffin v. Unocal Corp., 990 So. 2d 291 (Ala. 2008) (stating
that a “cause of action ‘accrues’ as soon as the party in whose favor it arises is entitled to
maintain an action thereon.”); Payton v. Monsanto Co., 801 So. 2d 829, 835 (Ala. 2001) (“It
is only when the first legal injury occurs that the cause of action accrues and the limitations
period begins to run.”). But see Wright v. Eli Lilly & Co., 65 Va. Cir. 485, 490 (2004) (“A
cause of action is the operative set of facts giving rise to a right of action. It accrues when a
wrongful act or breach of duty occurs, even though actual damage may not occur until a later
date. A right of action accrues to a person when he sustains damage or injury therefrom.”).
76 See United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117, 122 (1979) (finding that the cause of
action had accrued, triggering the statute of limitations when the plaintiff suffered hearing
loss resulting from ingestion of neomycin, and rejecting the plaintiff’s claim that the limi-
tations period should begin when he discovered he had suffered a “legal injury” from taking
neomycin); S.V. v. R.V., 933 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Tex. 1996) (“As a rule, we have held that a cause
of action accrues when a wrongful act causes some legal injury, even if the fact of injury is
not discovered until later, and even if all resulting damages have not yet occurred.”). The
Alabama Court has recognized that while the rule regarding the invasion of a legal interest
is rather simply stated, it is often more difficult in ascertaining exactly when accrual occurs,
beginning the running of the statute of limitations:
There is a class of cases in which a different statement of the rule is nec-
essary, though the basic principle is the same. They are cases in which
the act complained of does not itself constitute a legal injury; that is, an
injury giving rise to a cause of action because it is an invasion of some
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concluded in Soliman v. Philip Morris Inc.,77 that the statute of limita-
tions began to run on a claim for injuries arising out of nicotine addiction
at the time at which the plaintiff became addicted. The court stated:
[W]here an injury, although slight, is sustained in conse-
quence of the wrongful act of another, and the law affords a
remedy therefor, the statute of limitations attaches at once.
It is not material that all the damages resulting from the act
shall have been sustained at that time, and the running of
the statute is not postponed by the fact that the actual or
substantial damages do not occur until a later date.78
The Alabama Supreme court in Kelley v. Shropshire,79 articulated a rule
similar to the one followed in Soliman, finding that if the act from which
injury flowed was itself a completed wrong regardless of how slight the
damage was at the time, the statute of limitations would run on the occur-
rence of the act and bar recovery even for damages that might develop later
or that might not have been actionable at the time the wrong occurred.80
“[I]n such a case the subsequent increase in the damages resulting gives
no new cause of action.”81 The Kelley court went on to state, however, that
legal right. In such cases, plaintiff’s injury, the invasion of his rights, de-
pends upon a further and subsequent development of what defendant has
done, and the cause of action accrues and the statute begins to run when,
and only when, the damages are sustained.
Kelley v. Shropshire, 75 So. 291, 292 (Ala. 1917). The challenge of pinpointing precisely when
a cause of action accrues is especially difficult in continuous tort situations. See Garrett,
368 So. 2d at 520–21 (finding the injury occurred and the one-year statute of limitations
“began to run when plaintiff was last exposed to radiation” and not when the injury “made
itself manifest by its symptoms” twenty years later).
77 Soliman v. Philip Morris, Inc., 311 F.3d 966 (9th Cir. 2002).
78 Id. at 972 (quoting Nodine v. Shiley Inc., 240 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2001)). Some courts
have suggested that the harm must be appreciable before the limitations period will begin
to run. “Until a patient ‘suffers appreciable harm’ as a consequence of [tortious conduct], he
cannot establish a cause of action.” Larcher v. Wanless, 557 P.2d 507, 512 n.11 (Cal. 1976)
(quoting Budd v. Nixen, 491 P.2d 433 (Cal. 1971)). See also Davies v. Krasna, 535 P.2d
1161, 1169 (Cal. 1975) (“[A]lthough a right to recover nominal damages will not trigger the
running of the period of limitation, the infliction of appreciable and actual harm, however
uncertain in amount, will commence the statutory period.”); Budd v. Nixen, 491 P.2d 433,
436 (Cal. 1971) (finding a mere breach of duty causing “only nominal damages, speculative
harm, or the threat of future harm,” without causing appreciable damage did not create a
cause of action in legal malpractice to trigger statute of limitations).
79 Kelley, 75 So. at 292.
80 Id.
81 Id.
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a different statement of the rule may be necessary in cases where the
defendant’s act did not constitute a legal injury.82 “In such cases plain-
tiff’s injury, the invasion of his rights, depends upon a further and sub-
sequent development of what defendant has done, and the cause of action
accrues and the statute begins to run when, and only when, the damages
are sustained.”83
In most cases, when a cause of action will be deemed to accrue for
statute of limitations purposes varies depending upon whether the trig-
ger point is the defendant’s conduct, the point at which the plaintiff suf-
fered injury, or when the plaintiff first had a presently enforceable demand,
and is entitled to sue.84
This choice, unnecessary where the two events are simulta-
neous, becomes complex where considerable time intervenes;
here the courts have generally looked to the substantive ele-
ments of the cause of action on which the suit is based. If the
defendant’s conduct in itself invades the plaintiff’s rights,
so that suit could be maintained regardless of damage—as
with a breach of contract and most intentional torts—the
statute commences upon completion of the conduct. But if
harm is deemed the gist of the action, the occurrence of
harm marks the beginning of the period.85
The rule of repose affords no such latitude. While statutes of limita-
tions are governed by when a cause of action accrues, application of the rule
of repose is driven primarily by the tortious conduct of the defendant.86 In
general, the rule of repose begins to run “after the defendant acts in some
way.”87 The focal point is not the harm itself, but rather, the harm-produc-
ing act of the defendant. Although both the harm and the harm-producing
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 See, e.g., Gazija v. Nicholas Jerns Co., 543 P.2d 338, 341 (Wash. 1975) (finding accrual
occurs when there is “actual and appreciable damage” but not when there is “mere danger
of future harm, unaccompanied by present damage” for the statute of limitations to be
triggered); Young v. Seattle, 191 P.2d 273 (Wash. 1948) (discussing several cases where
statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff is entitled to sue). But see Develop-
ments in the Law, supra note 10, at 1200 (noting that where the plaintiff has control over
when an element necessary to bring an action occurs, such as the requirement that a de-
mand be made on the defendant, the limitations period may begin before suit could have
been filed).
85 Developments in the Law, supra note 10, at 1200–01.
86 See ANNE E. MELLEY, 50 TEX. JUR. 3d LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS § 4 (2013).
87 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1423 (7th ed. 1999). See also PROSSER & KEETON, supra note
6, at 168.
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conduct can be simultaneous, the trigger for the rule of repose is not con-
ditioned upon when harm occurs.88 As a consequence, rules of repose can
begin to run even where a cause of action has not yet accrued and they
are neither subject to, nor affected by, concepts of accrual that govern the
applicable statutory limitations period.89
Interestingly, even in states such as Alabama, with a long-standing
common law rule of repose, the case law generated no clear delineation
as to its application, with the confusion exacerbated by seemingly conflict-
ing statements as to when the rule would be triggered.90 Regurgitation of
language in older precedents, regardless of its ambiguity, only contributed
to the murky depths within upon which the concept of repose has rested.91
Judicial findings that the rule of repose runs “from the moment that the
actions giving rise to the claim occurred”92 or that “[repose] is not based
on concepts of ‘accrual,’ ”93 simply raised the question of whether the rule
incorporates traditional concepts of accrual and just excluded application
of equitable devices like the discovery rule.94 Although several previous
Alabama decisions suggested that the rule of repose was dependent upon
the accrual of a cause of action,95 recent decisions sought to address the
88 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 87, at 1423.
89 See, e.g., id.
90 Compare Moore v. Liberty Nat’l Ins. Co., 108 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1275 (N.D. Ala. 2000),
aff’d sub nom. Moore v. Liberty Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 267 F.3d 1209 (11th Cir. 2001)
(“Application of the rule of repose has only one element—the passage of twenty years
time from the moment that the actions giving rise to the claim occurred—and if that time
has elapsed, no claim can be pursued.”), and Ex parte Liberty Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 825 So.
2d 758 (Ala. 2002) (stating that “repose does not depend on ‘accrual,’ because the concept
of accrual sometimes incorporates other factors, such as notice, knowledge, or discovery”),
with Willis v. Shadow Lawn Mem’l Park, 709 So. 2d 1241, 1243 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998) (stating
that “this 20-year period does not start to run until a plaintiff’s cause of action has accrued”),
and Barrett v. Wedgeworth, 518 So. 2d 1256, 1257 (Ala. 1987) (implying accrual depends
on knowledge when the court rejected plaintiff’s efforts to contest the validity of a divorce
decree entered twenty-six years earlier, finding that the plaintiff “had knowledge of the
divorce judgment shortly after it was entered . . . [and] could have filed a motion for relief
from the judgment at that time, but did not.”).
91 Id.
92 Moore, 108 F. Supp. 2d at 1266.
93 Ex parte Liberty Nat’l Life Insurance Co., 825 So. 2d at 760.
94 In one decision, the Alabama Supreme Court had commented in dicta that notice was
requisite to the running of the rule, and certainly notice—or lack thereof—seemed to play
a role in other decisions. See Oehmig v. Johnson, 638 So. 2d 846, 850–51 (Ala. 1994),
abrogated by Ex parte Liberty Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 825 So. 2d 758 (refusing to find the rule
of repose had been activated to transfer mineral interest from owner of legal title to a party
with only color of title without first having constructive notice of the potential claim).
95 See, e.g., Baugher v. Beaver Const. Co., 791 So. 2d 932, 934 n.1 (Ala. 2000) (distinguishing
construction statute of repose from a statute of limitations, citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
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confusion. Ex parte Liberty National Life Insurance Co., to some extent
reflected an effort by the Alabama Court to clarify the operation of the
rule of repose to a plaintiff’s claim distinct from statutes of limitations.96
Nonetheless it remained unclear, at least in Alabama, whether by “claim”
the court meant that there was a legal right to sue until recently. Collins
v. Scenic Homes,97 American General Life and Accident Insurance Co. v.
Underwood,98 and Owens-Illinois v. Wells,99 decided subsequent to Liberty
National, explicitly stated that the rule does not begin to run until the first
date that the plaintiff suffered an actual injury, thereby helping to alle-
viate the ambiguity surrounding the rule of repose in earlier Alabama
case law.100
In other jurisdictions, however, the courts have held that opera-
tion of the rule of repose is not dependent upon whether the plaintiff does
or does not have a right to bring a claim or even suffered an injury.101 The
courts analysis stops upon identifying some act or event caused by the de-
fendant from which the rule is deemed to run.102 The focus in repose cases,
in defining a statute of repose as one that “bars a suit a fixed number of years after the
defendant acts in some way” and noting that the statute at issue began to “run upon the
substantial completion of the improvements, rather than upon the injury to the plaintiff’s
person or property or upon accrual of the plaintiff’s cause of action.”); Ex parte Grubbs,
542 So. 2d 927, 930–31 (Ala. 1989) (court dismissed claim for racial discrimination in the
denial of admission to law school over thirty years previously, noting that “[b]y failing to
assert a claim for over a third of a century . . . after Grubbs knew of the discrimination, he
is now absolutely barred by the rule of repose from asserting such a claim”); Barrett, 518
So. 2d at 1257 (court rejected plaintiff’s efforts to contest the validity of a divorce decree
entered 26 years earlier, finding that the plaintiff had “knowledge of the divorce judgment
shortly after it was entered . . . [and] could have filed a motion for relief from the judgment
at that time, but did not”); Willis, 709 So. 2d at 1243 (stating “this 20-year period does not
start to run until a plaintiff’s cause of action has accrued.”).
96 See Ex parte Liberty Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 825 So. 2d at 764–65.
97 Collins v. Scenic Homes, Inc., 38 So. 3d 28 (Ala. 2009).
98 Am. Gen. Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Underwood, 866 So. 2d 807 (Ala. 2004).
99 Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Wells, 50 So. 3d 413 (Ala. 2010).
100 Earlier Alabama decisions provided little illumination on the role of accrual in repose
cases, despite efforts by some courts to clarify the issue. See, e.g., id. at 417, (“Alabama’s
20-year common-law rule of repose does not begin to run on a claim until all the essential
elements of that claim, including an injury, coexist so that the plaintiff could validly file
an action.”). The federal district court in Evans v. Walter Industries, Inc., 579 F. Supp.
2d 1349 (N.D. Al. 2008) concluded that the claim arose upon injury, regardless of notice
to the plaintiff that injury had occurred. Id. at 1361.
101 See, e.g., Stirchak v. Shiley, Inc., 1996 WL 166958, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 5, 1996) (finding
a plaintiff’s right to bring a claim might be terminated under the repose statute before he
or she even knows of the injury).
102 See, e.g., Stuart v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 158 F.3d 622, 627–28 (2d Cir. 1998); Miller v.
Stroud Twp., 804 A.2d 749, 752 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002) (finding that product liability
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at least as the operation of the rule is currently conceived, seems to center
on the defendant’s conduct regardless of when the plaintiff may have suf-
fered legally compensable harm or even discovered that he or she had been
harmed by the defendant.103 More significantly, the discovery rule—which
will toll the statute of limitations until the plaintiff either discovers the
injury, or knows (or in the exercise of reasonable care should know) that
the defendant is a culpable party—will not stop the rule of repose from
running.104 Thus, crucial to the operation of a rule of repose is identifica-
tion of the “act” which triggers the running of the rule.105
Statutory rules of repose, particularly those directed toward protect-
ing certain interests groups such as the construction industry or medical
professionals, will often contain a trigger date within the statutory pro-
visions in an effort to avoid any ambiguity as to when the limitations pe-
riod begins.106 Thus in cases involving architects, builders, and contractors,
for example, the statute may run from the date the work was substan-
tially completed.107 Although some ambiguity may surround terms such
statute of repose which provided that it began to “run when the product ‘is first sold or
leased for consumption’ ” was triggered on the date plaintiff was inoculated with vaccine)
(citing NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-244(2) (1995)). See also Moore v. Liberty Nat’l Life Ins. Co.,
267 F.3d 1209, 1218 (11th Cir. 2001) (“A defining characteristic of the rule of repose is
that its time period does not begin to run when the action accrues, but rather when the
relevant action occurs.”).
103 Ex parte Liberty Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 825 So. 2d 758, 764 n.2 (Ala. 2002) (stating that
“repose does not depend on ‘accrual,’ because the concept of accrual sometimes incor-
porates other factors, such as notice, knowledge, or discovery”).
104 Comstock v. Collier, 737 P.2d 845, 848–49 (noting that the General Assembly passed
the statute or repose in part to “reduce the . . . ‘long tail’ of liability occasioned by the dis-
covery rule . . . ”); Reynolds v. Porter, 760 P.2d 816, 819–20 (Okla. 1988) (explaining that
legislatures responded to the application of the discovery rule by courts to modify statutes
of limitation, by enacting absolute statutes of repose).
105 Statutory rules of repose, unlike their common law counterpart, typically contain a
trigger date within the statutory provisions in an effort to avoid any ambiguity as to when
the limitations period begins. See, e.g., Reynolds, 760 P.2d at 819–20. Thus in cases in-
volving architects, builders and contractors, for example, the statute may run from the date
the work was substantially completed. See Baugher v. Beaver Const. Co., 791 So. 2d 932,
934 n.1 (Ala. 2000) (statute began to run “upon the substantial completion of the improve-
ments, rather than upon the injury to the plaintiff’s person or property or upon accrual
of the plaintiff’s cause of action.”); Nichols v. R.R. Beaufort & Assocs., 727 A.2d 174, 176–
77 (R.I. 1999) (citing statute of repose protecting contractors and others providing real
property improvements from claims not brought within ten years of the improvement’s
substantial completion).
106 See Baugher, 791 So. 2d at 934 n.1.
107 See Yarbro v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 655 P.2d 822, 825–26 (Colo. 1982) (explaining the
conduct that triggers the running of the construction rule of repose as a “legislative judg-
ment . . . [and] construction or design defects are likely to be discovered within a reasonable
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as “substantial completion,” custom in the industry as to the meaning
of “substantial completion” is sufficient to allow the fixation of a certain
time.108 The common law rule and more general statutes of repose, which
usually will govern claims for trespass and nuisance damages, often lack
such certainty, providing instead, for example, “except that no such ac-
tion may be brought more than three years from the date of the act or
omission complained of.”109 In environmental contamination cases, identi-
fying the point at which the rule of repose is triggered presents particular
challenges.110 Even with the conduct-oriented focus of the triggering act
as contemplated by the rule, trespass and nuisance law does not easily
yield a clearly identifiable time at which the clock begins to tick.111
A. Identifying the Defendant’s “Act” in Environmental
Contamination Cases for Purposes of Repose
In assessing the defendant’s conduct in environmental trespass and
nuisance cases, establishing when the defendant acts for purposes of the
rule of repose can be complex. In its simplest form, the defendant’s act
would be calculated from the first action or conduct of the defendant that
period after substantial completion of the building.” Id. at 825); McDonough v. Marr
Scaffolding Co., 591 N.E.2d 1079, 1081 (Mass. 1992) (applying substantial completion
standard for statute of repose to improvements to real property); Baldwin Carpet Linoleum
& Carpet, Inc. v. Builders, Inc., 523 N.W.2d 33, 38 (Neb. Ct. App. 1994) (noting Nebraska
Supreme Court’s rule that statutory repose period begins to run from the date construction
is complete for architects with a duty to inspect for the duration of the project); Monson
v. Paramount Homes, Inc., 515 S.E.2d 445, 447 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999) (citing North Carolina
statute that defines substantial completion as “[the] degree of completion of a project, im-
provement or specified area or portion thereof . . . upon attainment of which the owner can
use the same for the purpose for which it was intended”).
108 For medical malpractice claims, see Bonin v. Vannaman, 929 P.2d 754, 765–66 (Kan.
1996) (stating statute of repose for medical malpractice cases runs from the time of the
act giving rise to the cause of action, despite whether plaintiff has discovered the injury);
Tomlinson v. George, 116 P.3d 105, 111–12 (N.M. 2005) (stating statute of repose begins
to run from date of malpractice, not from date of plaintiff’s discovery); Landis v. Physicians
Ins. Co. of Wisconsin, 628 N.W.2d 893, 910 (Wis. 2001) (stating that statute of repose runs
from date of act or omission).
109 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-584 (West 2013).
110 See Anne M. Payne & Amy Elizabeth Hanigan, Pollution of Underground Water
Sources—Common Law Liability and Private Rights of Action, 94 AM. JUR. TRIALS 1–210,
35 (C. Joseph Mills, et al., eds., 2004) (stating that there are multiple causation problems
at issue with contaminated ground water).
111 See generally DAN B. DOBBS, ET AL., DOBBS’ LAW OF TORTS § 244 (2d ed. 2013) (demon-
strating the different types of triggering events, and thus the complexity of the issue).
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causes harm.112 Two potential scenarios emerge.113 In one scenario, a
defendant acts at the time the defendant actually engages in the harm-
producing conduct—such as directly emitting pollutants into the air, pour-
ing toxic chemicals onto the ground, or burying hazardous waste.114 The
plaintiff’s claim would be inchoate until the pollutant or chemicals reached
the plaintiff’s property, but the rule of repose—which is unconcerned with
accrual—would run from the moment the emission or discharge occurred.115
Under this articulation of the act the identification of the trigger point for
the rule of repose, disregarding for the moment any implications that may
be created by continuing tort theory, is uncomplicated.116 The spotlight is
squarely upon the actual conduct of the defendant at its origin.117 Thus, the
point of discharge, in whatever form it takes, serves to trigger the rule and
the clock would count down from that point forward. There is, of course,
potential for confusion if discharge or disposal is not narrowly restricted to
the defendant’s affirmative act in initially introducing pollutants into the
environment, whether or not actual contamination occurred at that time.118
112 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 87, at 1423.
113 Although defendant presumably could also act by failing to abate the trespass or nui-
sance, this effectively would conflate with the point of first migration as the day the pollut-
ants migrate onto the property creates a corollary obligation on the defendant to abate the
same day. Christopher M. Rhymes, Environmental Contamination as Continuing Trespass,
42 ENVTL. L. 1381, 1389 (2012).
114 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 87, at 1423.
115 See id.
116 See generally id. (showing that the only concern for triggering date is when an event
occurs).
117 In Cereghino v. Boeing Co., the district court explained that under Oregon law, “it is
clear that the ‘act or omission’ referred to in the statute of ultimate repose is an act or
omission of a person, not the act of objects such as hazardous substances.” Cereghino v.
Boeing Co., 826 F. Supp. 1243, 1248 (D. Or. 1993) (referencing Josephs v. Burns, 491 P.2d
203 (Or. 1971)). Further, “the statute begins to run at the time of an initial negligent act
or omission, and does not refer to any ongoing duty to correct the initial wrong.” Id.
118 For example, hazardous or toxic waste that has been stored or landfilled at a hazardous
waste storage facility may not begin leaking until sometime subsequent to being deposited
in the landfill. See generally Payne & Hanigan, supra note 110 (providing a thorough analy-
sis of issues relating to groundwater contaminant migration and water contamination
issues in general). If the act of discharge or disposal is tied to the date on which the waste
began to leak, then identification of when the repose period is triggered is obscured. Id. And,
even with the identification of discharge for purposes of repose as the date the waste was
deposited—i.e., disposed of—the commingling of wastes deposited over time could create
similar difficulties as, once again, it would be difficult to pinpoint when the deposit of the
culpable material occurred. Id. To the extent the landfill is no longer in operation the last
deposit could be pinpointed and presumably used as the trigger date. Id. Where there is an
ongoing operation, however, absent a unique waste identifier or marker (or generator) then
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Nonetheless, the point of discharge or disposal will, as a practical matter,
be reasonably ascertainable.119
Alternatively, a defendant can also be said to first act as the con-
taminants migrate onto the plaintiff’s property. In other words, the rele-
vant conduct would not be limited to the initial discharge but include the
separate act of permitting the migration or intrusion as well.120 Under this
construction of ‘act,’ it would be akin to the storage or piling of material
onsite that the defendant subsequently fails to keep contained as, for ex-
ample, in Rylands or in the water percolation cases.121 The action causing
the harm is not the deposit or the storage, but the failure to stop the move-
ment or migration of the contaminations onto the plaintiff’s property.122
In tort law, “[t]he word ‘actor’ is used merely for convenience, and is used
not only in its primary sense of denoting one who acts, but also as denoting
one who deliberately or inadvertently fails to act.”123 Here, the plaintiff’s
claim would vest immediately upon migration, regardless of plaintiff’s
knowledge of the contamination.124 While accrual for statute of limita-
tions purposes might be subject to equitable tolling, the rule of repose
would begin to run at the point the migration across the property line first
occurs.125 This latter approach to the question of when the defendant acts
the date on which the last deposit of the specific waste causing plaintiff’s damage, in other
words the waste that began the contamination, would remain obscured. Id.
119 See id. at 104 (describing the ease of ascertaining such discharge or disposal points
through aerial photography).
120 See, e.g., United Proteins, Inc. v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 915 P.2d 80, 83 (Kan. 1996)
(“Although the original trespass was outside the limitations period, if UPI could prove
that Farmland permitted the contamination to remain on UPI’s property within the limi-
tations period and that the original intrusion was tortious, there might be culpable conduct
on which recovery could be based.”); O’Neill v. Dunham, 203 P.3d 68, 72–73 (Kan. Ct. Ap.
2009) (noting that if defendants’ failure to install a handrail the day after purchasing build-
ing was negligent then the claim would be barred by the repose statute); O’Brien Energy
Sys., Inc. v. Am. Emp’rs Ins. Co., 629 A.2d 957, 963 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (interpreting the
language of insurance policy exclusions to exclude coverage for all injuries resulting from
pollution, even passive polluters, especially when the complaint alleges guilt for “acts and
omissions that flatly resulted in the migration of landfill gas.”).
121 See Rylands v. Fletcher, [1866] 1 L.R. Exch. 265 (Eng.).
122 See, e.g., Joseph v. S & J Operating Co., 2012 WL 1535172, at *5 (D. Kan. May 1, 2012)
(“There is no trespass until the entry is accomplished and the damage occurs (or has begun
to occur, as in the case of continuing trespass).”) (citing Nida v. American Rock Crusher
Co., 855 P.2d 81 (Kan. 1993)).
123 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 3 cmt. a (1965).
124 See id. See also Joseph, 2012 WL 1535172, at *5.
125 Running repose from the point at which the contaminants first migrate across the
plaintiff’s property renders any subsequent migration as irrelevant and simply part of
a single act. See Soo Line R.R. v. B.J. Carney & Co., 982 F. Supp. 1365, 1368 (D. Minn.
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reduces the ability to pinpoint a time certain that the intrusion—or act—
occurred and, as a consequence, also interferes with the ability to fix a trig-
ger date for repose purposes.126 However, whether through modeling or
other means that examine soil permeability, dispersion rates, migration
patterns, and related factors affecting the movement of contaminants, some
conclusions can be reached in a given case as to when contamination likely
began.127 Similar modeling or engineering analysis may also be able to
predict how long contaminants will continue to migrate onto a plaintiff’s
property.128 Nonetheless, absent scientific modeling taking into account the
various factors that impact flow rate and movement, a discrete event or
events from which migration occurred can be traced or, alternatively, some
contamination that is either clearly visible or has an immediate effect on
health, livestock or plants, and therefore migration affords less certainty
than where the relevant act is the date of discharge.129
Neither approach is a panacea for the environmental plaintiff.
Under either construction, the unaware plaintiff may be precluded from
bringing an action for the harm to his or her property.130 Where the defen-
dant’s act is construed as occurring at the time of discharge or disposal,
the contaminants may not cross over the plaintiff’s property line for some
years and easily well outside the repose period, depending upon the location
of the plaintiff’s property in relation to the discharge point.131 Migration
1997) (finding repose period in Minnesota Environmental Response and Liability Act pre-
vented liability for continuing migration of contaminants because to find otherwise would
defeat the purpose of the statute to protect those parties whose actions occurred prior to
July 1, 1983). But see Cereghino v. Boeing Co., 826 F. Supp. 1243, 1248 (D. Or. 1993) (“In the
present action, plaintiffs’ contentions that the ‘acts’ complained of are the invasion of con-
taminants, and that the omission was the failure to prevent the migration after disposal,
therefore fail. The Oregon Supreme Court left no doubt in Josephs that potential plaintiffs
such as the Cereghinos can be barred from recovery even before they have been harmed.”).
126 See Soo Line R.R. Co., 982 F. Supp. at 1368 (addressing this issue by treating continuing
contamination as a single act for repose purposes).
127 See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Dow Chem. Co., 10 F. Supp. 2d 771, 772 (E.D. Mich. 1998).
128 See, e.g., id. at 794 (using modeling methods to determine liability for groundwater con-
tamination from pollutants in the soil).
129 Defendants regardless should not be able to absolve themselves of their responsibility
for acting simply because the act is passive. See generally Peter N. Davis, Groundwater
Pollution: Case Law Theories for Relief, 39 MO. L. REV. 117 (1974). As noted by Professor
Davis, “Although a particular polluter might still legitimately claim he could not predict
particular injurious consequences of his activity, he can no longer claim legitimately that
the polluting material vanished from the earth once it seeped beneath the surface. He
knows it will go somewhere.” Id. at 145–46.
130 See id. at 146.
131 See Payne & Hanigan, supra note 110, at 31 (stating that contaminants can migrate
significant distances, thus implying the difficulty of a successful trespass suit).
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of contaminants is impacted by a number of factors such as soil perme-
ability, rainfall, and viscosity of the contaminant (light liquids move faster
than heavy oils).132 Soil contamination tends to be significantly slower
than groundwater contamination given geologic or geographic factors.133
However, even with groundwater contamination migratory paths are not
static.134 Additional years may pass before the plaintiff is even aware that
contamination has occurred. A similar outcome occurs where the act is the
point at which migration across the property line first occurs. The plaintiff
remains equally ignorant of its consequences until such time as the harm
or damage manifests or is discovered. Consequently, the potential for the
rule to run before the plaintiff can sue is heightened, leaving the plaintiff
forced to bear the burden of the cost of remediation.135
1. Continuing Tort Theory in Trespass and Nuisance Cases
Complicating matters, however, is the question of whether the
continuing tort doctrine does or should impact when the defendant’s act
triggers the rule of repose, or if it is applicable only to statutes of limita-
tions. Trespass and nuisance include as part of the gravamen of the claim
the recognition that a continuing invasion of the plaintiff’s interest is a
new trespass or nuisance for each day that the conduct continues or the
harm remains unabated.136
Decisions dating back to the 1500s have recognized that
a nuisance or trespass claim does not arise once and for
all when the offensive activity at issue first manifests it-
self. . . . Blackstone regarded this ‘well established’ rule as
132 See id. at 35 (stating that proving contamination causation depends on a variety of
factors).
133 Zones of clay would, for example, prohibit downward migration. See id. at 30 (discuss-
ing the transmission of water, but noting that it is not entirely dependent on porosity).
Alternatively substrate disturbances, excavations or drilling could create conduits for
contaminants to reach groundwater and exacerbate the spread of pollutants. Id. Porosity
and permeability impact not only soil contamination levels but also the ability of the
medium to transmit groundwater. Id.
134 Thus while groundwater in more shallow aquifers generally follow topography, heavy
periods of rainfall could cause a shift in flow direction, which can move laterally as well
as vertically. For a general outline, see id. at 34.
135 Alternative remedies such as through government action under CERCLA or other
federal or state environmental statutes might provide some relief.
136 Kyle Graham, The Continuing Violations Doctrine, 43 GONZ. L. REV. 271, 308 (2008–
2009).
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axiomatic in his Commentaries, stating that ‘every contin-
uance of a nuisance is [considered] a fresh one.’137
A defendant who has engaged in a single tortious act resulting in contin-
uing invasion of the plaintiff’s interest or in multiple tortious acts closely
related in time or character and causing harm or accumulating harm to
the plaintiff’s property remains liable.138 Plaintiffs can elect to bring succes-
sive suits as the harm accumulates or to bring a single claim for all harm
suffered.139 As a consequence, a finding that a nuisance or trespass is con-
tinuing will impact both statute of limitations considerations as well as the
amount of damages recoverable.140 Its impact on the rule of repose, how-
ever, is less settled.
Trespass and nuisance theories recognize that the nature and scope
of an invasion could impact the extent of the defendant’s liability.141 In
Russo Farms, Inc. v. Vineland Bd. of Educ.,142 the New Jersey Supreme
Court explained the continuing tort doctrine using nuisance as an exam-
ple, stating:
When a court finds that a continuing nuisance has been
committed, it implicitly holds that the defendant is com-
mitting a new tort, including a new breach of duty, each
137 Id.
138 Id.; Smith III, supra note 16, at 57–58 (1995). In Rosato v. Mascardo, the court noted that
the doctrines of continuing course of treatment and continuing course of conduct shared
common policies. Rosato v. Mascardo, 844 A.2d 893, 898 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004). “The con-
tinuing course of conduct doctrine reflects the policy that, during an ongoing relationship,
lawsuits are premature because specific tortious acts or omissions may be difficult to iden-
tify and may yet be remedied . . . . For example, the doctrine is generally applicable under
circumstances where [i]t may be impossible to pinpoint the exact date of a particular negli-
gent act or omission that caused injury or where the negligence consists of a series of acts or
omissions and it is appropriate to allow the course of [action] to terminate before allowing
the repose section of the statute of limitations to run . . . .” Id. at 898.
139 Smith III, supra note 16, at 58.
140 See, e.g., Miller v. Cudahy Co., 858 F.2d 1449, 1456 (10th Cir. 1988) (“The temporary-
permanent distinction which is determinative in regard to the running of the statute of
limitations is also relevant to the question of the proper measure of damages resulting
from an actionable nuisance.”). The Restatement (Second) of Torts notes, “When there is
a series of continuing harms the plaintiff, . . . has an election to recover or is permitted to
recover damages only for harm to the use of the land up to the time of trial. In cases of this
type, the statute does not run from the time of the first harm except for the harm then
caused.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 899 cmt. d (1979).
141 “A trespass may be committed by the continued presence on the land of a structure, chat-
tel, or other thing which the actor has tortiously placed there, whether or not the actor has
the ability to remove it.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 161(1) (1965).
142 Russo Farms, Inc. v. Vineland Bd. of Educ., 675 A.2d 1077 (N.J. 1996).
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day, triggering a new statute of limitations. That new tort
is an ‘alleged present failure’ to remove the nuisance and
‘[s]ince this failure occurs each day that [defendant] does
not act, the . . . alleged tortious inaction constitutes a con-
tinuous nuisance for which a cause of action accrues anew
each day.143
In some circumstances, however, the invasion was characterized
as permanent, despite the fact that the harm was unabated, limiting the
plaintiff’s remedy to a single action.144 The determination that the inva-
sion is permanent does not absolve the defendant of responsibility.145 It is
simply recognition that “through subsequent conduct on his part it has now
become impossible or impracticable for him to terminate the intrusion on
the other’s land.”146 Factors utilized by the courts to determine whether
an invasion was temporary (and therefore continuing) or permanent have
varied.147 Some jurisdictions simply adhere to the plain meaning of the
words.148 Thus the Texas Supreme Court, in Schneider Nat’l Carrier Inc.
143 Id. at 1084 (quoting Rapf v. Suffolk County, 755 F.2d 282 (2nd Cir. 1985)).
144 See also Dombrowski v. Gould Elecs., Inc., 954 F. Supp. 1006 (M.D. Pa. 1996) (applying
the discovery rule to find trespass and nuisance claims barred by statute of limitations by
distinguishing continuing trespass with the continuing harm of a permanent trespass of
property contamination). See also Smith III, supra note 16, at 57 (stating “[h]istorically,
however, there was a presumption that all nuisances and trespasses were not continuing
and the remedy for a continuing nuisance or trespass was either a suit for injunctive relief
or successive actions for damages as new injuries occurred.”).
145 Dombrowski, 954 F. Supp at 1013–14.
146 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 161 cmt. c (1965).
147 See generally In re WorldCom, Inc., 320 B.R. 772 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005); Kentland-
Elkhorn Coal Co. v. Charles, 514 S.W.2d 659 (Ky. Ct. App. 1974); Schneider Nat’l Carriers,
Inc. v. Bates, 147 S.W.3d 264 (Tex. 2004).
148 See Schneider Nat’l Carriers, Inc., 147 S.W.3d 264 (using the “plain meaning” of the terms
as decided by Texas courts over the past century to determine if nuisance injuries were
permanent or temporary). Cases abound with elaborations of the temporary-permanent
distinction in nuisance and trespass claims. See, e.g., Gates ex rel. Triumph Mortg., Inc. v.
Sprint Spectrum, L.P., 349 Fed. Appx. 257 (10th Cir. 2009) (discussing trespass); Stevenson
v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 327 F.3d 400, 408–10 (5th Cir. 2003) (concerning tres-
pass damages); Beatty v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 860 F.2d 1117, 1122–24
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (discussing nuisance); In re WorldCom, Inc., 320 B.R. 772, 775–82 (analyz-
ing trespass); Starrh & Starrh Cotton Growers v. Aera Energy LLC, 63 Cal. Rptr. 3d 165,
170–71, 174 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (discussing various forms of permanent trespasses);
Briscoe v. Harper Oil Co., 702 P.2d 33, 36 (Okla. 1985) (concerning nuisance); Kentland-
Elkhorn Coal Co., 514 S.W.2d at 664 (analyzing nuisance). For more cases defining the
temporary-permanent distinction along different lines than the Texas courts, see Schneider
Nat’l Carriers, Inc., 147 S.W.3d at 271 nn. 14–18.
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v. Bates,149 explained that “Texas courts have defined temporary and per-
manent nuisances along lines that are somewhat closer to the plain mean-
ing of the words. We define a permanent nuisance as one that involves
‘an activity of such a character and existing under such circumstances that
it will be presumed to continue indefinitely.’ ”150
The Schneider court similarly defined a temporary nuisance as
one that was “of limited duration”151 or “occasional”152 and “sporadic and
contingent upon some irregular force such as rain,”153 again consistent with
its conclusion that the terms carried their plain meaning.154 The Tenth
Circuit in Miller v. Cudahy Co.,155 commented on the inconsistent use of
the terms “temporary” and “permanent” in the Kansas case law in an ap-
peal involving the pollution of an aquifer by a salt mining company.156
Quoting the district court’s efforts to synthesize Kansas law in the area,
the court summarized:
When realty is damaged by pollution, the terms “temporary”
and “permanent” can be applied to three quite distinct fac-
ets of the situation. First, the pollution itself, or the causal
chemistry of the injury to the land, may be either tempo-
rary or permanent. Second, the damage or loss caused by
the injury may be temporary or permanent. Last, the source
or origin of the pollution, be it a sewage plant, an oil well,
or a salt mine, may be temporary or permanent.157
In most states, however, the determination that a tort is continuing
or permanent has been dictated in part by whether the analysis centered
149 Schneider Nat’l Carriers, Inc., 147 S.W.3d at 272.
150 Id. The court went on to state that a permanent nuisance was “constant and con-
tinuous.” Id.
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Id. (explaining that the Schneider court rejected abatability as a relevant consideration).
154 See id. at 270–73 (recognizing the unique nature Texas courts use to determine the
temporary or permanent nature of a nuisance by applying the “plain meaning” of the terms
to the specific fact scenarios of each claim while other jurisdictions draw the distinction
on other more nuanced tests).
155 Miller v. Cudahy Co., 858 F.2d 1449, 1453–54 (10th Cir. 1988).
156 Kentland-Elkhorn Coal Co. v. Charles, 514 S.W.2d 659 (Ky. 1974).
157 Miller, 858 F.2d at 1456 n.7 (citing Miller, 567 F. Supp. at 899–900). The court then
observed “[t]he possibilities for inconsistencies are, of course, multiplied when different
labels are applied to these facets, such as, for example, calling the source of the pollution
a nuisance and then characterizing the nuisance as temporary or permanent.” Id.
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on the defendant’s tortious conduct or on the recurring or continuing harm
caused by conduct that may or may not be ongoing.158 To the extent the
jurisdiction follows a conduct-centered approach, the invasion would be
deemed permanent upon the last act of the defendant.159 Where the juris-
diction adopts a harm-based approach, however, the continued existence
of harm or injury resulting from the invasion will give rise to a continuing
tort.160 According to one commentator:
158 Id. at 1457.
159 See Hogg v. Chevron USA, Inc., 45 So. 3d 991, 1006 (La. 2010) (refusing to classify
damage to land caused by gasoline deposits prior to 1996 as a continuing tort because “the
operating cause of the injury—the damage-causing conduct—is not continuing.”). “When
a trespass which permanently changes the physical condition of the land is concluded, no
additional causes of action accrue merely because the damage continues to exist or even
progressively worsens.” Id. at 1003. See also Vill. of Milford v. K-H Holding Corp., 390
F.3d 926, 933 (6th Cir. 2004) (“A continuing wrong is established by continuing tortious
acts, not by continual harmful effects from an original, completed act.”) (quoting Horvath
v. Delida, 540 N.W.2d 760, 763 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995)); Page v. United States, 729 F.2d 818,
821 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“It is well-settled that ‘[w]hen a tort involves continuing injury, the
cause of action accrues, and the limitation period begins to run, at the time the tortious
conduct ceases.’ ”) (quoting Donaldson v. O’Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 529 (5th Cir. 1974)),
vacated on other grounds, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); LaBauve v. Olin Corps., 231 F.R.D. 632,
656 (S.D. Ala. 2005) (“Alabama courts have clarified that the ‘continuous tort’ doctrine is
not available in instances where a single act is followed by multiple consequences, but rather
requires ‘repetitive acts or ongoing wrongdoing.’ ”) (quoting Payton v. Monsanto Co., 801
So. 2d 829, 835, n.2 (Ala. 2001)). The court in Horvath v. Delida points out that in situations
involving permanent property damage resulting from “flooding, overflow, or seepage” the
majority of jurisdictions find that a cause of action accrues “at the time the land is first
visibly damaged.” Horvath, 540 N.W.2d at 762.
160 “A trespass may be committed by the continued presence on the land of a structure,
chattel, or other thing which the actor has tortuously placed there, whether or not the
actor has the ability to remove it.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 161(1) (1965). The
Restatement (Second) of Torts states:
Activities that create a physical condition differ from other activities in
that they may cause an invasion of another’s interest in the use and
enjoyment of land after the activity itself ceases. When the invasion con-
tinues only so long as the activity is carried on, a person who ceases to
have any part in the activity is not liable for the continuance of the inva-
sion by others. But if the activity has resulted in the creation of a physical
condition that is of itself harmful after the activity that created it has
ceased, a person who carried on the activity that created the condition
or who participated to a substantial extent in the activity is subject to
the liability for a nuisance, for the continuing harm. His active conduct
has been a substantial factor in creating the harmful condition and so
long as his condition continues the harm is traceable to him. This is true
even though he is no longer in a position to abate the condition and to
stop the harm. If he creates the condition upon land in his possession
and thereafter sells or leases it to another, he is subject to liability for
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Widespread acceptance of the thrust, if not the precise
terms, of these approaches means that a condition that
might cause the plaintiff damage and which the defendant
can inexpensively remove or render harmless will more
often than not be deemed a continuing source of harm.
Meanwhile, a situation that obviously will cause the plain-
tiff harm, and prove exceedingly costly for the defendant or
anyone else to abate, will more often be labeled a perma-
nent nuisance or trespass.161
In Breiggar Properties, L.C. v. H.E. Davis & Sons, Inc.,162 for ex-
ample, a trespass case involving road debris that had been deposited on
adjoining property, the Utah court reiterated its ruling in previous deci-
sions that the focus in characterizing a trespass as permanent or continu-
ing looked “solely to the act constituting the trespass, and not to the harm
resulting from the act.”163 A trespass would be permanent where the act
of trespass had ceased and would be considered a continuing trespass
invasions caused by the condition after the sale or lease as well as for
those occurring before.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 834 cmt. e (1979) (continuing liability for harmful
physical conditions). See Limestone Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Lemont, 520 F.3d 797, 801 (7th Cir.
2008) (noting the purpose of “continuing violations” torts is to “allow suit to be delayed
until a series of wrongful acts blossoms into an injury” because the torts are focused on
“cumulative” rather than a “continuing” violation); Tiberi v. Cigna Corp., 89 F.3d 1423,
1430 (10th Cir. 1996) (“Under the continuing wrong doctrine, however, ‘where a tort in-
volves a continuing or repeated injury, the cause of action accrues at, and limitations begin
to run from, the date of the last injury.’ ”) (quoting 54 C.J.S. Limitation of Actions § 177
(1987)). “This continuing-tort doctrine, which becomes relevant only when the tortious con-
duct is ongoing, is to be distinguished from the rule applicable when the plaintiff’s injury
continues or is manifested after the tortious conduct has ceased.” Page, 729 F.2d at 821, n.23
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (citing Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949); Wilson v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 111 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). See also Mangini v. Aerojet-Gen. Corp., 281 Cal.
Rptr. 827, 841 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (“[T]he ‘continuing’ nature of the nuisance refers to
the continuing damage caused by the offensive condition, not to the acts causing the of-
fensive condition to occur.”); State Dept. of Envtl. Prot. v. Fleet Credit Corp., 691 So. 2d
512, 514 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (“[I]t is the ongoing contamination, not the initial
disposal of wastes, that constitutes a continuing but abatable, nuisance.”).
161 Graham, supra note 136, at 310–31.
162 Breiggar Properties v. H.E. Davis & Sons, 52 P.3d 1133, 1135 (Utah 2002).
163 Id. See also Castellani v. Bailey, 578 N.W.2d 166, 179 (Wis. 1998) (rejecting plaintiff’s
argument that maintenance of surveyor’s stake in ground constituted a continuing tort
and stating that the “mere fact that the monument remains in the ground does not some-
how transform that single act into a series of continuing events such that the limitations
period can be tolled.”).
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where there was more than one trespass that continued to occur.164 Simi-
larly, the Sixth Circuit in Vill. of Milford v. K-H Holding Corp.,165 found
Michigan law barred the town’s claim for trespass arising from the contam-
ination of the municipal water supply due to migration of pollution off the
defendant’s property.166 In holding that the defendant was not liable for pol-
lution damages despite the continued seepage of water onto the plaintiff’s
property, the court stated “[e]ven if further migration occurred, it was not
a new act of trespass . . . the seepage of more water without further acts by
the defendant does not constitute an additional tort. In the absence of fur-
ther acts by K-H there was no continuing trespass.”167 The Massachusetts
Supreme Court adopted a conduct-centered approach in Carpenter v.
Texaco, Inc.168 Although the court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that
a continuing trespass resulted from the seepage onto his property from
gasoline from an underground storage tank which had been maintained
by the defendant, the plaintiff had not alleged either additional acts by the
defendant or additional seepage once the storage tank had been removed,
well outside of the limitations period.169 The court stated that “a continu-
ing trespass . . . must be based on recurring tortious or unlawful conduct
and is not established by the continuation of harm caused by previous but
terminated tortious or unlawful conduct.”170 Despite acknowledging that
plaintiff’s property remained contaminated, the court concluded that the
defendant had engaged in a single encroachment resulting in a permanent
trespass and the claim was barred by the statute of limitations.171
Neiman v. NLO Inc.,172 reflects a case adopting a harm-centered
approach where the Sixth Circuit, applying Ohio law, considered whether
164 Breiggar, 52 P.3d at 1135–36.
165 Vill. of Milford v. K-H Holding Corp., 390 F.3d 926, 932 (6th Cir. 2004).
166 Id. at 932–33.
167 Id. at 933 (citations omitted).
168 Carpenter v. Texaco, Inc., 646 N.E.2d 398 (Mass. 1995).
169 Id. at 399–400.
170 Id. at 399.
171 Id. at 399–400. See also Kohler v. Germaine Inv. Co., 934 P.2d 867, 869 (Colo. App. 1996)
(finding limitations period began upon disclosure of contamination present on property
and when evidence was provided that the cause of the contamination had ceased for a
number of years before reoccurring gave rise to separate causes of actions). In a subsequent
decision in Taygeta Corp. v. Varian Assoc. Inc., 763 N.E.2d 1053, 1065 (Mass. 2002), the
Massachusetts court distinguished Carpenter on the basis that although the defendant’s
dumping of hazardous material on its property had ceased a number of years earlier, un-
like Carpenter, migration of contaminants off the property was continuing such that the
plaintiff had stated a claim for a continuing nuisance. Id. at 1065.
172 Nieman v. NLO, Inc., 108 F.3d 1546 (6th Cir. 1997).
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the plaintiff was required to allege a course of continuing conduct in order
to show a continuing trespass.173 The court held the plaintiff would estab-
lish a continuing trespass where the plaintiff could show the existence of
continuing harm or damage, even though the conduct leading to the in-
jury had occurred outside the limitations period.174 The Colorado Supreme
Court, in Hoery v. United States,175 also recognized that the continued pres-
ence of contaminants on the plaintiffs’ property would constitute a con-
tinuing tort so long as the contamination could be abated.176 “We decline
to hold, as urged by the United States, that its wrongful conduct has ceased
and that the contamination of Hoery’s property represents only the product
of that prior conduct.”177
Within the framework of conduct-centered or harm-centered analy-
sis, other factors have also played a role.178 A number of courts generally
have considered a continuing nuisance or trespass as one that was easily
abatable,179 a determination often influenced by whether the intrusion
173 See id. at 1554–60. The district court had granted the motion to dismiss on the basis that
the complaint reflected a permanent trespass and was outside the limitations period. Id.
174 Id. at 1559.
175 Hoery v. United States, 64 P.3d 214 (Colo. 2003).
176 Id. at 218.
177 Id. at 222.
178 See also Ronald G. Aronovsky, Back from the Margins: An Environmental Nuisance
Paradigm for Private Cleanup Cost Disputes, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 395 (2006), discussing
the various approaches adopted by the courts and noting that “[g]iven the wide range of
tests applied by courts across the country, it is not surprising that some courts have
concluded that no one factor should be determinative of whether a nuisance is continuing
or permanent. Instead, a number of courts have employed a multi-factored balancing
test.” Id. at 454.
179 In Arcade Water Dist. v. United States, for example, the Ninth Circuit rejected the dis-
trict court’s finding that the alleged nuisance, which involved toxic contamination leaching
into plaintiff’s well, was permanent, finding instead that even if the contamination lasted
a number of years, it might ultimately abate. 940 F.2d 1265, 1268 (9th Cir. 1991). As such,
the plaintiff had alleged a continuing nuisance and the lower court’s dismissal of the com-
plaint as barred by the statute of limitations was improper. Id. at 1269. See also Morsey
v. Chevron, 94 F.3d 1470, 1476 (10th Cir. 1996) (discussing the distinction between tem-
porary or continuing damages, recoverable where the cause of damages are “remediable,
removable, or abatable” and permanent damages “given on the theory that the cause of
injury is fixed and that the property will always remain subject to that injury”) (quoting
McAlister v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 662 P.2d 1203, 1212 (Kan. 1983)); Mangini v. Aerojet-
Gen. Corp., 281 Cal. Rptr. 827, 840 (Ct. App. 1991) (“[T]he crucial distinction between a per-
manent and continuing nuisance is whether the nuisance may be discontinued or abated.”);
Hedgepath v. Am. Tel. and Tel. Co., 559 S.E.2d 327, 337 (S.C. Ct. App. 2001) (characterizing
a continuing nuisance as one where the “abatement is reasonably and practically possible,”
triggering a new statute of limitations with each new property invasion); City of Sioux
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resulted from or was caused by a permanent structure.180 California, for
example, attempts to distinguish the “true nature of a trespass” by deter-
mining whether, among other things, it “can be abated at any time, in a
reasonable manner and for reasonable cost, and is feasible.”181 In addi-
tion, courts have looked at whether the source of the offending activity
continued to operate or had been shut down,182 as well as the duration of
the offending activity.183 Key in the analysis is whether the activity was
of such a character and existed under such circumstances that it was
constant, as opposed to occasional or intermittent.184
Falls v. Miller, 492 N.W.2d 116 (S.D. 1992) (finding that if the nuisance is not reasonably
abatable due to the necessity of the structure causing the nuisance in the operation of a
public utility, it will be considered permanent, triggering the statute of limitations when
the injury first occurred).
180 In Nugent v. Pilgrim’s Pride Corp., for example, the Texas Court of Appeals commented
that in most cases where the invasion has been held to be permanent, “a permanent facility
or structure was the culprit, and the damage causing activity was continuous and presum-
ably would have continued indefinitely.” 30 S.W.3d 562, 570 (Tex. App. 2000).
181 Starrh & Starrh Cotton Growers v. Aera Energy LLC, 63 Cal. Rptr. 165, 172 (Cal. App.
4th 2007) (citing 8 MILLER & STARR, CAL. REAL ESTATE § 22.39). See also Arcade, 940 F.2d
at 1268–69.
182 See, e.g., McAlister, 662 P.2d at 1211–12 (finding nuisance was permanent where de-
fendant’s oil operations that had discontinued in the 1940s and had polluted plaintiff’s
water well and, for all practical purposes, there was no indication the pollution was abat-
able in the foreseeable future).
183 The court in Beck Dev. Co. v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., balanced multiple factors derived from
several tests applied by previous courts to determine if a nuisance was continuing or per-
manent, including: the duration of the offending activities; the likelihood of the nuisance
changing over time; the probability the contaminants would create new damage by con-
tinuing to migrate; the ability to abate the nuisance at any moment; and whether the costs
of abatement was the best choice, considering several factors. 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 518, 557–60
(Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
184 See, e.g., Bayouth v. Lion Oil Co., 671 S.W.2d 867, 868 (Tex. 1984) (“Temporary in-
juries, however, have been found where the injury is not continuous, but is sporadic and
contingent upon some irregular force such as rain.”) disapproved of by Schneider Nat.
Carriers, Inc. v. Bates, 147 S.W.3d 264 (Tex. 2004) (“[A] nuisance should be deemed a
‘temporary nuisance’ . . . only if the nuisance is so irregular or intermittent over the
period leading up to filing and trial that future injury cannot be estimated with reason-
able certainty.”); Cate v. Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Corp., 904 F. Supp. 526, 539 (W.D.Va.
1995) (finding defendant’s facility that “pepper[ed]” plaintiffs’ homes with noise and
vibrations were intermittent but occurred with enough frequency to be a continuous nui-
sance and the health hazards created were not permanent because “the existence of such
nuisances will tend to fluctuate with prevailing winds, weather patterns, and industrial
activity.”). See also 54 C.J.S. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS § 236 (2005) (“A nuisance may be
considered temporary if it is uncertain whether any future injury will occur, if future in-
jury is liable to occur only at long intervals, or if the nuisance is occasional, intermittent,
or recurrent, or is sporadic and contingent upon some irregular force such as rain.”).
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Other courts have gone so far as to weigh the social utility of the de-
fendant’s conduct. For example, in Denver & Santa Fe R.R. v. Hannegan,185
the Colorado Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that a rail-
way line running next to the plaintiff’s property was a continuing trespass,
holding instead that the trespass was permanent.186 The court based its
ruling principally on the grounds that the defendant had lawful authority
to build the railway line and that the defendant’s activity was “vital” to the
state’s future.187 In In re Hoery,188 the Colorado Supreme Court reiterated
that social utility was a relevant consideration, stating that Colorado law
recognized continuing tort theory in trespass and nuisance cases and “[t]he
only exception is a factual situation—such as an irrigation ditch or a rail-
way line—where the property invasion will and should continue indefi-
nitely because defendants, with lawful authority, constructed a socially
beneficial structure intended to be permanent.”189
The Colorado cases reflect that extending the analysis into the so-
cial utility of the defendant’s conduct can have a significant effect on the
outcome.190 In general, however, while there is some general consistency
overall among jurisdictions as to the factors that are relevant in determin-
ing the applicability of continuing tort theory, there is nonetheless clearly
variation in application.191
185 Denver & Santa Fe R.R. Co. V. Hannegan, 95 P. 343 (Colo. 1908).
186 Id. at 346.
187 In re Hoery, 64 P.3d 214, 220–21 (Colo. 2003); see generally Hannegan, 95 P. 343 (Colo.
1908). But see Meyers v. Kissner, 594 N.E.2d 336, 340 (Ill. 1992) (“While a lawful act will
not constitute a public nuisance, it can nonetheless constitute a private nuisance.”).
188 Hoery, 64 P.3d 214.
189 Id. at 220. Irrigation ditches, for example, were considered to be a permanent improve-
ment and to “seep by necessity” for an indefinite period. Id. at 219. See, e.g., Middelkamp
v. Bessemer Irrigating Ditch Co., 103 P. 280, 282 (Colo. 1909) (finding a permanent injury
where a ditch that was properly constructed will necessarily continue to seep due to the qual-
ity of the land). Since they were also considered by the court to be a significant social utility,
the court found that the ditch was a permanent, rather than a continuing, nuisance. Hoery,
64 P.3d at 220. The Hoery court relied heavily upon the Restatement (Second) of Torts in
its discussion. The court ultimately concluded, among other things, that the contamination
migrated continuously onto Hoery’s property and as a consequence amounted to a con-
tinuing tort, that it was abatable, and that the pollution carried with it no economic or
social benefit. Id. at 222–23. The court also considered the public policy of incentivizing
the prevention and remediation of hazardous contaminants afforded by the continuing
tort doctrine. Id. at 229.
190 Hoery, 64 P.3d at 220.
191 The divergence in treatment of the different factors has been noted by a number of
commentators. See, e.g., Aronovsky, supra note 178; Christopher M. Rhymes, Comment, 
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2. Environmental Contamination as a Continuing Tort
Injuries arising out of pollution or contamination to land have
been found to be a continuing trespass or nuisance, depending on whether
the jurisdiction adopts a harm-centered or conduct-centered approach and
whether a trespass or nuisance will be deemed temporary, i.e., abatable,
versus permanent.192 In Hoery v. United States,193 the plaintiff alleged that
his land had been contaminated by toxic chemicals which had migrated
onto his property from the former Lowry Air Force Base nearby.194 The
United States had ceased operations at the base in 1994.195 Hoery filed
suit in 1998 and the district court held that the last act by the defendant
(United States) occurred in 1994 upon the cessation of operations at the
U.S. base and Hoery’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations de-
spite Hoery’s claim that the migration of contaminants onto his property
constituted a continuing tort and therefore rendering his action timely.196
Finding there was no Colorado precedent, the Tenth Circuit certified to
the Colorado Supreme Court the question of whether 1) the continued mi-
gration of contaminants constituted a continuing trespass and/or nuisance
and 2) whether the ongoing presence of contaminants was a continuing
trespass and/or nuisance.197 The Colorado court answered both questions
Environmental Contamination As Continuing Trespass, 42 ENVTL. L. 1381 (2012); Graham,
supra note 136, at 271.
192 See Arcade Water Dist. v. United States, 940 F.2d 1265, 1267–69 (9th Cir. 1991) (in a
nuisance claim for the contamination of a well, while its continuing nature was determined
by the ongoing “harm suffered,” the nuisance was still characterized as temporary due to
potential for abatement); Employers Inc. of Ala. v. Rives, 87 So. 2d 653, 656–57 (Ala. 1955)
(finding that a bolt improperly tightened resulting in a gas leak that continuously contami-
nated a nearby well can still be regarded as an “accidental injury” under the terms of an
insurance policy even though it may be difficult “to separate the amount of damage done
within the period of the statute of limitations from that occurring in the period preceding.”);
Howell v. City of Dothan, 174 So. 624, 627–29 (Ala. 1937) (finding claims for damages to
trees and land resulting from sewage contamination of a creek were time-barred under
limitations statute because they were sufficiently “separable” from other damages and the
time of their destruction was inadequately proven to justify relief); Burley v. Burlington N.
& Santa Fe RR. Co., 273 P.3d 825, 839 (Mont. 2012) (a “nuisance of a continuing tem-
porary nature includes migrating pollution”); see also Rhymes, supra note 191, (discussing
the conduct-based and injury-based approaches to continuing tort theory and migration
as a continuing trespass).
193 Hoery, 64 P.3d 214.
194 Id. at 215.
195 Id. at 216.
196 Id. at 216–17.
197 Id. at 215.
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in the affirmative, holding that the defendant’s failure to remove the pollu-
tion constituted a continuing invasion and that as the pollutants continued
to migrate onto the property, “[t]he failure of the United States to stop the
toxic pollution plume that it created from entering Hoery’s property also
constitutes a continuing property invasion.”198
Maine similarly rejected arguments that continuing tort theory
did not embrace environmental contamination in Jacques v. Pioneer
Plastics, Inc.199
We see no reason why our long-standing rule of what con-
stitutes a continuing nuisance or trespass should contain
an exception for environmental waste . . . If we were to
exclude from this test environmental contamination cases
the effect would be to grant defendants the equivalent of
an easement, thereby reducing significantly the changes
that the hazardous materials would be cleaned up.200
And in Miller v. Cudahy Co., the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court
finding that the salt water contamination of an underground aquifer that
flowed beneath the plaintiffs’ property was a continuing nuisance.201 The
court held that the harm to the aquifer was remediable once the pollution
was abated, and noted that there was no contention that the salt mining
operations could not be altered or discontinued.202
Some courts are less certain that continuing tort theory is the
proper framework within which to analyze trespass claims for environ-
mental harm. Looking to precedents developed to address injuries caused
by the intrusion of water onto neighboring property, these courts have con-
cluded that injury due to migration or seepage of contaminants are com-
parable and should follow a similar approach. Thus, in Wilson v. McLeod
Oil Company,203 the court stated “[a]s with the cases where the diversion
of water caused water to accumulate on another’s property, the ongoing
seepage of the gasoline into Ms. White’s water creates, in the language
of Duval, ‘a renewing rather than a continuing trespass.’ ”204 Under North
Carolina precedent, a continuing trespass accrued from a completed act
198 Hoery, 64 P.3d at 222.
199 Jacques v. Pioneer Plastics, Inc., 676 A.2d 504 (Me. 1996).
200 Id. at 508.
201 Miller v. Cudahy Co., 858 F.2d 1449 (10th Cir. 1988).
202 Id. at 1455.
203 Wilson v. McLeod Oil Co., 398 S.E.2d 586 (N.C. 1990).
204 Id. at 596 (citing Duval v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 77 S.E. 311 (1913)).
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rather than continuous acts. The seepage of gasoline was akin to the re-
peated floodings discussed in prior precedent such as Roberts v. Baldwin205
and Spilman v. Navigation Co.206 The end result is the same however, with
the successive acts constituting a new trespass for each occurrence.
For the environmental plaintiff, the assertion of a trespass or nui-
sance claim as continuing can have a pronounced impact on whether the
claim can overcome prescriptive bars, particularly where that harm is
latent.207 Where a trespass or nuisance is considered “continuing,” each
repetition or day upon which the intrusion continues means that a new
cause of action will accrue until the offending condition has abated or been
removed.208 As a result, the plaintiff could bring successive actions for
damages, although recovery usually would be limited to injury suffered
within the limitations period prior to the commencement of the action.209
In continuing trespass and nuisance cases, most jurisdictions hold that the
statute of limitations will not run until the date of the last act giving rise
to the harm.210 The “last act” requirement is typically construed as the last
205 Roberts v. Baldwin, 66 S.E. 346 (N.C. 1909).
206 Spilman v. Roanoke Nav. Co., 74 N.C. 675 (1876).
207 See Mangini v. Aerojet-General Corp., 912 P.2d 1220, 1221 (Cal. 1996).
208 See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 6, at 83. Damages are limited to injuries sustained
up to the time of suit. Id.
209 See Neiman v. NLO, Inc., 108 F.3d 1546 (6th Cir. 1997) (plaintiff can only seek damages
incurred within the four years prior to commencement of the action); Meyers v. Kissner,
594 N.E.2d 336 (Ill. 1992) (plaintiff could recover damages for five-year period before com-
plaint was filed). A plaintiff who claims injury as the result of a continuing tort is gen-
erally held to have the right to elect whether to bring successive actions for immediately
ascertainable damages, or to wait and seek damages once the harm has ceased. See, e.g.,
DAN B. DOBBS, DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIES, § 5.11(1) (1993) (If a “trespass is ‘temporary’ or
‘continuous,’ a new cause of action arises day by day or injury by injury, with the result
that the plaintiff in such a case can always recover for such damages as have accrued
within the statutory period immediately prior to suit.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 161 cmt. b (1965) (When possessor of land has been injured by a continuing trespass, he
has the “option to maintain a succession of actions” due to the continuous nature of the
injuries.); Taygeta Corp. v. Varian Assoc., Inc., 763 N.E.2d 1053, 1064 (Mass. 2002) (“An
action for a continuing nuisance allows a plaintiff whose claim otherwise would be un-
timely to sue where its property rights are invaded from time to time because of repeated
or recurring wrongs, resulting in new harm to the property on each occasion.”).
210 See Leonhard v. Unites States, 633 F.2d 599, 613 (2d Cir. 1980) (stating in New York,
“ ‘[d]espite the general principle that a cause of action accrues when the wrong is done, re-
gardless of when it is discovered, certain wrongs are considered to be continuing wrongs,
and the statute of limitations, therefore, runs from the commission of the last wrongful
act.’ ”) (quoting N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 203 (McKinney 1972)); Reynolds Metals Co. v.
Yturbide, 258 F.2d 321, 333 (9th Cir. 1958) (“The rule that the statute runs from the last
date of the continuous negligent treatment is just and equitable”) (quoting Hotelling v.
Walther, 130 P.2d 944, 946 (Or. 1942)); McCoy v. Foss Mar. Co., 2006 WL 829109, *2 (W.D.
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act of actual intrusion (as opposed to the act that may have caused the
intrusion) and usually is commensurate with the point at which the in-
trusion is abated.211 Although damages traditionally have been limited to
Wash. Mar. 24, 2006) (citing cases finding “where the plaintiff is injured progressively and
where no single event is identified as the cause of the harm, plaintiff can seek redress for
the cumulative effect on the injury within three years of the cessation of the harm”); see,
e.g., State ex rel. Smith v. Kermit Lumber & Pressure Treating Co., 488 S.E.2d 901, 925
(W. Va. 1997) (stating statute of limitations do not accrue for public nuisances because they
are, by their nature, continuing due to the continuing need to protect against harms to the
“public health, safety, and the environment.”) Id. at 914. In Walton v. City of Bozeman,
the court found an owner of property still had a cause of action for flooding and pollution
that resulted from city’s repair of a sewer drain seven years earlier. 588 P.2d 518 (Mont.
1978). While the city claimed the cause of action was time-barred by the two-year statute
of limitations, the court found otherwise based on the continuing nature of the injuries
caused by the act:
. . . Where the injury is not complete so that the damages can be measured
at the time of the creation of the nuisance in one action, but depends upon
its continuance and the uncertain operation of the seasons or of the
forces set in motion by it, the statute will not begin to run until actual
damage has resulted therefrom. Thus, where the nuisance is temporary
and continuous in character, and gives rise to separate causes of action,
a recovery may be had for damages accruing within the statutory period
next preceding the commencement of the action . . . .
Id. at 521 (quoting Nelson v. C & C Plywood Corp., 465 P.2d 314, 324–25 (Mont. 1970)). But
see Rygg v. United States, 334 F. Supp. 219 (D.N.D. 1971) (finding flooding that resulted
from government excavations did not constitute a continuing tort and accrued “no later
than month when flooding occurred”) Id. at 221.
211 In Garrett v. Raytheon Co., Inc., the court held that where the tort is continuing, the
statute of limitations does not begin to run until after the “last day on which the plaintiff
was exposed to the dangerous conditions which caused the injury.” 368 So. 2d 516, 521 (Ala.
1979), overruled by Griffin v. Unocal Corp., 990 So. 2d 291 (Ala. 2008) (citing Minyard v.
Woodward Iron Co., 81 F. Supp. 414 (N.D. Ala. 1948), aff’d,170 F.2d 508 (5th Cir. 1948)).
See, e.g., Rapf v. Suffolk County of N.Y., 755 F.2d 282, 284 (2d Cir. 1985) (finding cities’
inaction by failing to maintain groins on beach constituted a continuing nuisance “for which
the cause of action accrues anew each day”); Roark v. Macoupin Creek Drainage Dist., 738
N.E.2d 574, 584–85 (Ill. 2000) (finding drainage district’s continuous failure to inspect and
keep drainage system functional violated their duty under the law, resulting in an ongoing
injury that triggered the statute of limitations from the time of the last injury). But see
Schneider Nat. Carriers, Inc. v. Bates, 147 S.W.3d 264 (Tex. 2004) (providing a thorough
explanation of the distinguishing characteristics of a temporary and permanent nuisance
as they have been defined and applied in American and Texas law). See, e.g., James R.
MacAyeal, The Discovery Rule and the Continuing Violation Doctrine as Exceptions to the
Statute of Limitations for Civil Environmental Penalty Claims, 15 VA. ENVTL L. J. 589,
620–21 (1966) (discussing rules of accrual for continuing trespass violations by pointing out
the “rule of separate accrual” is usually applied in limited circumstances to avoid awarding
huge damages). This approach permits the plaintiff to aggregate prior acts which, if viewed
individually, would be barred by the statute—in effect treating them as a single “act.” Id.
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the statutory period immediately preceding the commencement of the
action, where the accumulated harm is indivisible the distinction is at best
simply one of form.212 On the other hand, where the trespass or nuisance
is deemed permanent, the claim accrues and the limitations period begins
to run when the injury first occurs (or in jurisdictions following a discovery
rule, when the plaintiff discovers the harm), even if the plaintiff does not
yet know the full extent of the injury.213 Damages for a permanent nui-
sance assume that the property will always be subject to the injury and
include past as well as prospective harm.214
For purposes of the statute of limitations, then, characterizing
claims involving migration of contaminants across land as a continuing
trespass or nuisance presumably results in a new cause of action vesting
in the plaintiff each day that the migration continues or the pollution
remains unabated.215 For the purposes of the rule of repose, however,
the analysis runs parallel to its cousin and then diverges at the equi-
table point—or other devices might operate to toll the statute of limita-
tions period.216
212 See Starrh & Starrh Cotton Growers v. Aera Energy LLC., 63 Cal. Rptr. 3d 165 (Ct.
App. 2007).
213 Id. at 170–76 (discussing statute of limitations in the context of distinguishable forms
of permanent trespasses).
214 Miller v. Cudahy Co., 858 F.2d 1449 (10th Cir. 1988) (polluters of an aquifer un-
successfully argued the damages were permanent and thus, time-barred by the statute
of limitations).
215 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 899 cmt. d (1979) (discussing the continuing
harms of nuisance as they effect the statute of limitations). Burley v. Burlington N. & Santa
Fe R.R., 364 P.3d 825 (Mont. 2012), examines the tolling of statutes of limitations based
on two theories that have evolved “with respect to the effect of stabilization, migration, and
abatability” of pollutants. One theory treats the last day of dumping as the date the statute
of limitations is triggered, while the other theory focuses on the continuing migration re-
sulting from the dumped pollution to determine when the statute of limitations should be
triggered. Id. The court in State, Dept. of Envtl. Prot. v. Fleet Credit Corp., 691 So. 2d
512, 514 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997), recognized that in cases involving groundwater con-
tamination, most jurisdictions have generally treated the “ongoing contamination, not
the initial disposal of wastes, that constitutes a continuing, but abatable, nuisance” as
the event that triggers the limitations period. Consequently, the statute of limitations
begins when “the wrongful invasion of rights that constitutes the violation ceases.” Id.
The court continued to elaborate why environmental contamination cases are treated this
way by stating “[w]ere this not the case, then the Legislature’s stated intention to abate
pollution that threatens human, animal, aquatic, and plant life as well as property in-
terests would be wholly frustrated.” Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 403.021(5)–(6), (1995)). See also
Rhymes, supra note 191 (arguing that the conduct-based approach avoids the creation of
the imprescriptible trespass).
216 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 899 cmt. g. (1979).
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B. Using Continuing Tort Theory to Navigate the Rule of Repose in
Environmental Trespass and Nuisance Actions
The case law provides little guidance on how the rule of repose
applies or should apply in continuing trespass and nuisance cases where
the conduct involves the release of contaminants or the ongoing migration
from a previous release.217 At least one court has held that the continuing
tort theory does not impact the rule of repose. In Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Superior Court,218 the court stated in a case involving a construction de-
fect statute of repose “[n]either theory or [the discovery] rule may over-
ride the statute of repose created by the Legislature’s fixed starting point
and outer limit for latent construction defects.”219 Connecticut courts took
a different position, finding that the doctrine applies to toll the statute of
repose, stating it “naturally applies to the repose section of the statute, with
its ‘act or omission language’ ” and the action would be timely where the
“endpoint of the conduct” occurred within the repose period.220 In Rivera
v. Fairbanks Management Properties,221 the court explained:
[T]he doctrine is generally applicable under circumstances
where it may be impossible to pinpoint the exact date of a
particular negligent act or omission that caused injury or
where the negligence consists of a series of acts or omissions
and it is appropriate to allow the course of [action] to termi-
nate before allowing the repose section of the statute of
limitations to run.222
While on their face the rulings in Chevron and Rivera appear to be
at odds, they ask and answer different questions. While both posit an end
point to a defendant’s actions in ascertaining whether a cause of action
217 At least one court has held that the continuing tort theory does not impact the rule of
repose in a construction defect case, stating “[t]he continuing nuisance or trespass theory
allows for deferral of the starting date of the statute of limitations in much the same way
as does the discovery rule. Neither theory or rule may override the statute of repose created
by the Legislature’s fixed starting point and outer limit for latent construction defects.”
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 324, 328 (1st Cir. 1994).
218 Id.
219 Id. at 328. See also other California cases citing Chevron e.g., San Diego Unified School
Dist. v. Cnty. of San Diego, 87 Cal. Rptr. 3d 796 (2009); Inco Dev. Corp. v. Superior Court,
31 Cal. Rptr. 3d 872, 875 (2005); Gagerro v. Cnty. of San Diego, 21 Cal. Rptr. 3d 388 (2004).
220 See, e.g., Rosato v. Mascardo, 844 A.2d 893 (Conn. 2004); Rivera v. Fairbanks Mgmt.
Properties, 703 A.2d 808, 812 (Conn. 1997).
221 Rivera, 703 A.2d 808.
222 Id. at 812.
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could be pursued, their starting points, and thus their conclusions, are not
the same. It is clear that the Chevron court’s analysis begins and ends with
an interpretation of legislative intent with respect to a specific, special in-
terest statute of limitations that also included a repose period and refused
to go further.223 The California courts construed the statute as applying
to all causes of action, including contract and products liability to the ex-
tent those actions arose out of a latent construction defect. Accordingly
in Chevron, the court found that including trespass and nuisance claims
within its ambit not only was consistent with the “no action” mandate of
the statute, but “also furthers the Legislature’s goal of setting an outside
limit to protect contractors from extended liability.”224 The statute clearly
identified a fixed starting point (the substantial completion of construction)
and the repose period would run from that date, regardless of the theory
under which relief was sought. In contrast, the Rivera court examined the
defendant’s actions and sought to determine whether on balance a cause
of action could be pursued with the established doctrines of tort law.225
It is within the context of the Rivera court’s reasoning that this
Article circles back to a consideration of when a defendant’s act is no longer
a singular construct. As a starting point, the gravamen of the law of tres-
pass and the law of nuisance include within their bounds the concept of con-
tinuing harm.226 Unlike the static analysis given to the doctrines of trespass
and nuisance where the intrusion is singular, the parameters associated
with their continuing-harm brethren recognize that a new cause of action
or new harm comes to fruition with each measurable intrusion, whether
that harm was initiated by a single act or by multiple acts.227 Simply put,
while there are wide variations to this theme, continuous harms posit a dis-
cernible chain reaction of separate, discrete, and measurable events that
initially flow from a single act or set of actions of a defendant. Thus, the
continuing tort doctrines of trespass and nuisance are not overlays to estab-
lished tort doctrine. Rather, they are logical corollaries subsumed within
the base doctrines that provide an analytical framework meant to justly
measure and apportion harm and liability.228 For environmental plaintiffs
to succeed in overcoming the bar of repose, the approach adopted by the
223 Chevron, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 324.
224 Id. at 329. The statutory provision at issue provided that no action arising out of dam-
ages for any latent construction defect or resulting injury to real property could be brought
outside the stated ten year period. Id.
225 Rivera, 703 A.2d 808.
226 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 161 cmt. b. (1965).
227 See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 6.
228 See DOBBS, supra note 209.
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courts needs to recognize that just as the analytical framework associated
with nuisance and trespass expands within its natural bounds to balance
measurable events, so this analytical framework should extend to and be
reflected in the application of rules of repose.229 As a consequence, the dis-
positive issue centers on establishing at what measurable point in a con-
tinuing trespass or nuisance a defendant acts for purposes of the rule of
repose. Here, the analysis would shift from a focus on the first act of the
defendant to encompass all of the defendant’s harmful conduct.230 To some
extent, whether the approach to continuing trespass or nuisance is conduct-
centered or harm-centered will impact the analysis.
In placing the rule of repose within this framework, several con-
clusions become apparent. Where the relevant act of the defendant is
identified as the date of discharge, the continuing tort doctrine would com-
mand that each day of discharge is a new ‘act’ by the defendant, resulting
in a new invasion of the plaintiff’s interest. It is not until the last date of
discharge—or, for simplification, the cessation of operations—that the
intrusion would cease. Where the rule is triggered by the cessation of op-
erations, application within the context of continuing tort theory is fairly
straightforward.231 The continuing nature of the trespass ends with the
termination of the defendant’s harm-causing activities and the rule simply
runs from that point forward.232 Designation of the tort as continuing, then,
does not change the focus on the defendant’s tortious act and only shifts
the point at which the defendant has certainty as to the outer limit of his
liability for the last act of which the plaintiff could complain. This result
fits squarely within the conduct-centered approach, assessing whether a
trespass or nuisance is continuing with a focus solely on the defendant’s
wrongful affirmative acts. Since the rule is not tied to accrual, when the
pollutants actually enter the plaintiff’s property or whether the plaintiff
has notice of the entry are irrelevant and there is no obfuscation of the
date the clock begins to tick.233
229 To the extent the jurisdiction doesn’t recognize continuing trespass or nuisance, of
course, plaintiffs would be forced to rely on traditional trespass and nuisance theories.
See, e.g., Aronovsky, supra note 178, at 445 (noting that the continuing tort theory had been
rejected in Georgia and New York for property damage caused by contamination).
230 See generally Schneider Nat. Carriers, Inc. v. Bates, 147 S.W.3d 264 (Tex. 2004).
231 In the case of a permanent trespass or nuisance, subsequent migration would simply in-
crease the damages suffered by the plaintiff. See generally Aronovsky, supra note 178, at 455.
232 At that point either the tortious conduct has ended or, alternatively the nuisance or
trespass has been deemed permanent. Under either scenario the rule would be triggered.
Id. at 454.
233 Id. at 452–53.
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Continuing tort theory also introduces the potential for abatement
to play a greater role than when the trespass or nuisance was singular.234
Trespass and nuisance permit the extension of liability for the defendant’s
failure to abate the harm caused by their tortious activity. Thus, conceiv-
ably the defendant could still be considered to act through omission by fail-
ing to abate the pollution, which would result in the rule beginning to run
concomitantly with the statute of limitations—on the day the contamina-
tion is abated. However, despite the Restatement’s position and that of
cases such as Hoery that the failure to remove (here, abate) the offending
invasion is a continuing trespass for the entirety of the time it remains
present on the plaintiff’s land, most courts as well as the repose statutes
clearly tie the running of the rule of repose to some affirmative conduct by
the defendant rather than a failure to remedy the harm created by that
conduct once it has occurred. The “act by omission” theory in this circum-
stance, while certainly plausible, is nonetheless an unlikely choice for
adoption even in a harm-centered jurisdiction.235
It is not immediately apparent that the act of migration (allowing
the contaminants to cross onto the plaintiff’s property without impediment)
escapes a similar fate. As with the failure to abate, the defendant arguably
again acts by omission. Affirmative conduct in the traditional sense is ab-
sent and consistency would demand that as with the failure to abate pol-
lution, the failure to preclude migration would not extend the defendant’s
conduct beyond the act of discharge. Here, however, the defendant’s failure
to prevent contaminants from migrating offsite and onto the plaintiff’s land
affirmatively causes a new invasion rather than simply allowing a previous
invasion to continue unabated. The defendant actively causes the entry
not by the discharge of contaminants on the defendant’s own property ab
initio, in itself not tortious, but by not preventing their entry, which is. For
torts such as trespass and nuisance, it is this affirmative entry onto the
land or interference with use and enjoyment that forms the basis for the
tort and would preclude reliance upon a cessation of operations, or active
discharge, as the only tortious conduct that could raise the prescriptive bar.
Under this characterization of the defendant’s conduct, the continu-
ing tort doctrine would suggest that the rule of repose could be triggered
anew each day that migration occurs as each day there would be a new
entry, thus continuously restarting the repose period until migration
ended. Whether utilizing traditional continuing tort concepts that con-
strue the separate events of migration as one single act or alternatively
234 In re Hoery, 64 P.3d 214 (Colo. 2003).
235 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 324, 328 (1st Cir. 1994).
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as a continuous act, defendant liability would be calculated from the last
date contaminants migrated onto plaintiff’s property.236 Indeed, whether
conceptualized as a continuing tort or as even as a renewing tort as pos-
ited by the North Carolina court in Wilson v. McLeod Oil Co.,237 migration
would fix the actual entry on to the property as the operative point for trig-
gering the running of the rule as each entry, standing alone and regardless
of any prior conduct, is a trespass.238 Thus, continuing tort theory would
benefit the plaintiff who was unaware of the invasion until well after mi-
gration began, but discovered the contamination before migration ended or
the repose period expired. The challenge for plaintiffs—and a not inconsid-
erable one—would be to prove either when 1) contaminants began migrat-
ing onto their property, or 2) contaminants in fact continue to migrate.
Although perhaps comparable in form to statute of limitations rationales
under a harm-based “last act” approach, viewed in terms of failure to abate,
with repose, the focus remains on migration rather than abatement as the
determinative conduct trigger.
The recognition of a continuing harm framework in evaluating rules
of repose and their application in land contamination cases does not provide
plaintiffs with a new or unanticipated cause of action. The rule remains
unchanged both in form and function and is applied consistently within the
framework of the law of trespass and nuisance.239 At the same time, plain-
tiffs who were initially unaware of the defendants’ tortious actions or of the
harm to their property are not prevented by the rule from maintaining
a claim where they can demonstrate the defendant has created a continu-
ing trespass.240 The rule operates as intended; the continuing nature of
the tort serves to construe multiple individual acts—whether discharge or
migration—as a single instance of tortious conduct on the date of the last
act in the series. As noted by Graham in his exploration of the limits of
the continuing violations doctrine, the doctrine is not a tolling device or
discovery rule:
[W]hile both the discovery rule and equitable tolling sim-
ply manipulate when the statute of limitations begins or
236 See, e.g., Graham v. Beverage, 566 S.E.2d 603, 614 (W. Va. 2002).
237 Wilson v. Mcleod Oil Co., 398 S.E.2d 586 (N.C. 1990).
238 See, e.g., J & P Dickey Real Estate Family Ltd. P’ship v. Northrop Grumman Guidance
& Elecs. Co., 2012 WL 925015 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 19, 2012) (noting on motion to dismiss that
it was unclear from the allegations that the last act or omission occurred outside of the
repose period and the complaint alleged migration was still ongoing).
239 Graham, supra note 136, at 283–96.
240 Id. at 288–91.
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continues to run on a cause of action, the continuing viola-
tions doctrine takes the more drastic step of redefining the
very claim or claims as to which the limitations period or
periods apply.241
There may indeed be areas where courts as well as legislatures con-
clude that the goals underlying repose rules should take precedence over
those served by other doctrines, including the continuing tort doctrine.242
For example the Rivera court declined to extend the continuing course of
conduct doctrine to apply to accrual of the plaintiff’s cause of action out
of concerns that it would push the accrual point indefinitely as well as
“allow the plaintiff to acquiesce in the defendant’s conduct for as long as
convenient to the plaintiff” thereby undermining the purpose of the stat-
ute of limitations to prevent the defendant from being surprised by stale
claims.243 However, one commentator discussing the apparent abandon-
ment of equitable tolling principles for undiscovered fraud in securities
litigation cautioned:
Doctrine doesn’t matter because it is some primeval source
of authority, but because it is the outcome of authority’s
exercise. It is the condensed language in which a decision-
maker’s enforceable opinion is described. That language—
the “rule”—is carried forward into subsequent cases and is
itself cited as the basis for a decision. This is proper and
useful so long as the rule serves a redintegrative function,
a calling up of the earlier normative reckoning and a reaf-
firmation of it. If, however, the rule is mechanically cited
as sufficient unto itself, as a kind of conduit drawing on an
invisible noumenal realm, then, once again, we begin the
dangerous cycle of ascribing an “out there” authority to
rules, rather than probing for the normative commitment
underpinning the rules.244
241 Id. at 279–80.
242 Lyman Johnson, Securities Fraud and the Mirage of Repose, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 607,
615–16 (1992). The legislature making that determination can, and should, draft repose
rules that clearly identify when and how it applies. Id.
243 Rivera v. Fairbanks Mgmt. Properties, 703 A.2d 808, 812 (Conn. 1997). See also McCoy
v. Foss Mar. Co., 2006 WL 829109, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 24, 2006) (noting that applica-
tion of the continuing tort doctrine did “not undermine the public policy that is served by
a statute of limitations. Statutes of limitations exist to keep stale claims out of court. If
[defendant] perpetrate the tort within the last three years, the cause of action is not stale.”).
244 See Johnson, supra note 242, at 615–16.
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Crucial is the need to discourage blind adherence to rules or policies
that are no longer normative.245 Foremost among those policies was to pro-
vide certainty to defendants from liability for stale claims where evidence
and witnesses might no longer be available, and at the same time free up
economic resources which by extension benefited society. At first blush the
goal of repose—putting a finite limit on stale claims—would seem dis-
served through the adoption of migration or abatement as the relevant
trigger, suggesting an imprescriptible liability. MacAyeal explains that
courts did not perceive the continuing violations doctrine as undermining
the policies behind statutes of limitations (to prevent litigation of stale
claims), since “at least some of the evidence relating to events within the
limitations period is still fresh and subject to investigation.”246 MacAyeal
also notes that both trespass and nuisance claims, whether under a con-
tinuing tort theory or in their traditional form, in essence allow the defen-
dant to control when the last act occurs either through remediation of the
defendant’s property, thereby ending future migration, or by abatement.247
The continuing tort doctrine simply permits the plaintiff the opportunity
to present the bill to the defendant for the costs associated with defendant’s
activities, which defendant had externalized onto the plaintiff.
Nonetheless, the challenges facing environmental plaintiffs in re-
sponding to the specter of repose are not inconsiderable, should the jurisdic-
tion adopt either migration or abatement as the defendant’s act. The costs
associated with ascertaining when migration began can be significant and
will need to be juxtaposed against the economic burden facing the plaintiff
who undertakes the cost of remediation, should the repose bar apply.
CONCLUSION
The relevant case law suggests that irrespective of the divide, policy
makers and jurists have struggled with the absolutism of the rule of repose.
While rooted in sentiments of equity and justice, this struggle also ac-
knowledges that in overly protecting the interests of the defendant as well
as certain societal imperatives, the rule reduces the pool of monies avail-
able for remediation efforts and, at times, irrationally places the economic
costs of environmental contamination on the plaintiff. Continuing tort
theory permits a rebalancing of the equities between plaintiffs who have
not been dilatory and defendants’ right to be free of stale claims and their
245 Id.
246 MacAyeal, supra note 211, at 631.
247 Id.
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attendant economic impact on both defendants and society. Within this
construct, plaintiffs are no longer forced to bear the costs of a defendant’s
risk-producing activities and the incentives for defendants to externalize
those costs are reduced. Certainly, application of continuing tort theory
would encourage defendants to remediate contamination and at minimum,
defendants are not granted a proverbial free pass to pollute and, fingers
crossed, walk away.
Concededly, characterization of the defendant’s conduct as a con-
tinuing tort can result in pushing back the outside date beyond which the
defendant would have no further exposure to potential claims by the plain-
tiff and concerns attendant to the litigation of stale claims—including
witness recollection or discarded evidence—remain. However, it may sim-
ply mean that a plaintiff must think carefully before embarking upon a
path where success might be unlikely and lawyers should seriously con-
sider the obstacles presented by the passage of time before agreeing to
representation. Indeed, the increasing use of technology and ability to pre-
serve and record information, including digital storage, may even lessen
the importance of some of these concerns going forward. Regardless, they
should not, however, be the primary considerations in any discourse on
repose. More troubling is the economic impact not only on defendant but
on societal resources resulting from a shift in the outer temporal boundary
of liability, concerns frequently at the forefront of any rhetoric regarding
repose. Unnoticed, however, in assessments of economic impact is the
simultaneous financial benefit realized by the defendants by paying claims
in future rather than present dollars. In short, the case law and analysis
associated with continuing tort theory permit a more balanced approach
to liability in this area. Such an approach opens the door to a more rational
expansion of the pool of resources dedicated to the costs associated with
environmental contamination.
